Abstract

ASEAN has adopted decision-making by consensus. Taking ASEAN as a case study, this article aims to explain how competing positions are reconciled and international agreements reached in organisations that have adopted consensus, a process that risks non-agreement because each participant has veto power, as their sole decision-making rule. ASEAN roundtables with the foreign ministers of its member states have indeed generated some meaningful agreements. I argue that rules and customs associated with ASEAN chairmanship effectively comprise a reconciliation mechanism. The chair is empowered to play an agenda-setting role, and the combination of rotating chairmanship and a limited number of member states means that every state will enjoy the strong power, within a reasonably short period of time. Since each state knows that its turn will come soon, all are willing to allow the others to exert the power of the chair and guide consensus toward agreements that are consistent with the chair’s national interests. This article analyses the impact of a strong ASEAN chair via empirical case studies of decisions reached (or not) under consensus regarding issues where member states had conflicting interests. This analysis of ASEAN decision-making contributes to the ongoing debate on effectiveness of ASEAN and has theoretical implications for the understanding of international organisations that operate under similar institutional settings.

摘要

东盟以协商一致方式通过决策。以东盟为例，本文旨在解释在采用共识的组织中如何协调相互竞争的立场以及达成国际协议，这一过程可能会因每个参与者拥有否决权而面临不达成协议的风险，作为其唯一的决策规则。东盟与其成员国外长的圆桌会议确实产生了一些有意义的协议。我认为与东盟主席国相关的规则和习俗实际上构成了一个和解机制。主席有权发挥议程设置作用，轮值主席和有限数量的成员国相结合意味着每个国家都将在相当短的时间内享有强大的权力。既然每个州都知道很快就会轮到它，各方都愿意让其他国家发挥主席的权力，引导共识达成符合主席国家利益的协议。本文通过对在成员国存在利益冲突的问题上达成（或未达成）共识的决策的实证案例研究，分析了强大的东盟主席的影响。这种对东盟决策的分析有助于关于东盟有效性的持续辩论，并对理解在类似制度环境下运作的国际组织具有理论意义。本文通过对在成员国存在利益冲突的问题上达成（或未达成）共识的决策的实证案例研究，分析了强大的东盟主席的影响。这种对东盟决策的分析有助于关于东盟有效性的持续辩论，并对理解在类似制度环境下运作的国际组织具有理论意义。本文通过对在成员国存在利益冲突的问题上达成（或未达成）共识的决策的实证案例研究，分析了强大的东盟主席的影响。这种对东盟决策的分析有助于关于东盟有效性的持续辩论，并对理解在类似制度环境下运作的国际组织具有理论意义。