Abstract

Ostrom’s design principles are considered to characterize robust institutions for managing common-pool resources. However, the design principles can conceal and perpetuate power asymmetries to limit socially just outcomes, even while improving environmental outcomes. This study integrates theories on power with Ostrom’s design principles to examine power dynamics in watershed management groups in India and the United States through case study methods. Results reveal that power does not always manifest itself in an environment of injustice, but processes of domination and empowerment occur concurrently. Negative aspects of power are not manifested through overt conflict, but through non-participation, inaction, and silence of non-dominant actors. This is not to say that non-dominant actors are devoid of agency, as they may respond to domination through solidarities and building capabilities. Paying attention to these interdependencies can shed light on the potential for collective action for achieving not only environmentally sustainable but also socially just outcomes.

摘要

奥斯特罗姆的设计原则被认为是管理公共池资源的强大机构的特征。然而，即使在改善环境结果的同时，设计原则也可以隐藏和延续权力不对称，以限制社会公正的结果。本研究将权力理论与奥斯特罗姆的设计原则相结合，通过案例研究方法研究印度和美国流域管理团体的权力动态。结果表明，权力并不总是在不公正的环境中表现出来，但统治和赋权的过程同时发生。权力的消极方面不是通过公开的冲突表现出来，而是通过非主导行为者的不参与、不作为和沉默表现出来。这并不是说非主导角色缺乏代理，因为他们可能会通过团结和建设能力来应对统治。关注这些相互依存关系可以揭示集体行动的潜力，不仅可以实现环境可持续，而且还可以实现社会公正的结果。