ABSTRACT In my recent book, The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement, I develop a defense of non-conciliationism, but one that only applies in research contexts: Epistemic benefits are more likely in the offing if inquirers stick to their guns in the face of disagreement. I aim to expand my original account by examining its implications for non-inquiry beliefs. I’m particularly interested in broader worldview disagreements. I want to examine how inquirers should react upon discovering that they disagree about the truth value of a particular proposition because they disagree about a whole host of related propositions. I argue that in many ways, worldview disagreements are easier to work with than disagreement over isolated propositions, in part because it is easier to provide a set of criteria by which to evaluate worldviews. I conclude that my original argument can, at least in part, be successfully expanded to include worldview disagreement.

中文翻译：

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世界观分歧的认知好处

摘要在我最近的书《分歧的认知好处》中，我为非调解主义辩护，但仅适用于研究环境：如果询问者在面对分歧时坚持自己的立场，则认识好处更有可能出现。我的目标是通过检查它对非探究信念的影响来扩展我的原始帐户。我对更广泛的世界观分歧特别感兴趣。我想检查询问者在发现他们不同意某个特定命题的真值时应该如何反应，因为他们不同意一大堆相关命题。我认为，在许多方面，世界观分歧比孤立命题的分歧更容易处理，部分原因是提供一套评估世界观的标准更容易。