ABSTRACT

This article examines the trajectories of capital tax policies in Japan and South Korea over recent decades. Historically, the two countries present an ideal case for studying fiscal developmentalism in East Asia. Total taxation was low, although capital owners assumed higher tax burdens than workers and consumers. From the 1990s to 2010s, both countries underwent a series of market-oriented tax reforms. A large body of political economy literature contends that the tax structures of these countries became increasingly neo-liberal during this period. Cuts in capital taxes were the primary focus of such changes. This article seeks to review this interpretation of the capital tax policies of Japan and South Korea. Through an examination of statutory and effective tax rate data, it confirms that no “race-to-the-bottom” cutbacks happened to capital taxation in these countries. Despite sharing this common ground, however, Japan’s approach constitutes a more regressive case of capital tax adjustment than South Korea’s. The author elucidates the reasons behind this difference by employing a revised partisan theory of capital taxation. The empirical analysis demonstrates the validity of this claim by examining eight cases of partisan governments in Japan and South Korea from the 1990s to the 2010s.

摘要

本文考察了近几十年来日本和韩国的资本税政策轨迹。从历史上看，这两个国家是研究东亚财政发展主义的理想案例。尽管资本所有者承担的税收负担高于工人和消费者，但总税收较低。从 1990 年代到 2010 年代，两国都经历了一系列以市场为导向的税收改革。大量政治经济学文献认为，这些国家的税收结构在这一时期变得越来越新自由主义。削减资本税是这些变化的主要焦点。本文试图回顾对日本和韩国资本税政策的这种解释。通过对法定和有效税率数据的审查，它证实了这些国家的资本税没有发生“逐底”削减。然而，尽管有这个共同点，日本的做法构成了比韩国更倒退的资本税调整案例。作者通过采用修正的资本税党派理论来阐明这种差异背后的原因。实证分析通过考察 1990 年代至 2010 年代日本和韩国的 8 个党派政府案例，证明了这一主张的有效性。