ABSTRACT

Much of the scholarly work on politics in Zambia’s one-party state stresses the non-competitiveness of its parliamentary elections and holds that politicians were unable to cultivate the power of patronage because the political system was heavily weighted against the practice. This article uses a case study of Michael Sata, an individual politician who was twice elected Member of Parliament in Zambia’s capital city in the 1980s, to offer a two-fold reassessment of elections and patronage politics during the one-party state. First, it reveals how Sata successfully built links with leading business elites who, in the expectation that he would help them secure their businesses, financed his electoral campaigns. Second, it shows how Sata, who also simultaneously served as Governor of Lusaka, secured his re-election by using public resources to establish patronage support networks, expressed through the construction of housing units for his constituency’s burgeoning population. More broadly, the article demonstrates that it was possible under the one-party state to mobilise political support outside the party structures and build patronage networks that challenged the logic of centralised control. For the most part of one-party rule, however, these power bases were not visible and can only be uncovered through detailed case studies.

摘要

赞比亚一党制国家关于政治的许多学术著作都强调赞比亚议会选举的非竞争性，并认为政治家无法培养赞助人的权力，因为政治制度严重地背负了这种做法。本文使用萨塔，个别政客谁在上世纪80年代曾两次当选国会议员在赞比亚首都为例，所提供的一党制国家在选举期间和赞助政治两方面的重新评估。首先，它揭示了Sata如何成功与领先的商业精英建立联系，他们希望他能帮助他们确保自己的业务，为他的竞选活动提供资金。其次，它显示了同时担任卢萨卡省州长的萨塔（Sata）通过利用公共资源建立赞助支持网络来确保他的连任，这通过为他的选区的迅速增长的人口建造住房单位来体现。从更广泛的角度来看，该文章表明，在一党制国家下，有可能在党的体制之外动员政治支持，并建立挑战集中控制逻辑的赞助网络。但是，对于一党制规则的大部分而言，这些权力基础是不可见的，只有通过详细的案例研究才能发现。该文章表明，在一党制国家下，有可能在党组织之外动员政治支持，并建立挑战集中控制逻辑的赞助网络。但是，对于一党制规则的大部分而言，这些权力基础是不可见的，只有通过详细的案例研究才能发现。该文章表明，在一党制国家下，有可能在党组织之外动员政治支持，并建立挑战集中控制逻辑的赞助网络。但是，对于一党制规则的大部分而言，这些权力基础是不可见的，只有通过详细的案例研究才能发现。