ABSTRACT

Since 2015, Al-Shabaab and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) have been locked in a violent, protracted stalemate. There is little momentum to pursue a political settlement, with Al-Shabaab rejecting any overtures of dialogue. Drawing on theoretical perspectives from peace and conflict literature and key interviews with clan elders and Al-Shabaab defectors, this article explores two interconnected themes. First, Al-Shabaab's dynamic attitudes towards dialogue since the group's establishment; and second, how clan elders play diverse peace-seeking roles, negotiating between Al-Shabaab and FGS at the microlevel. The article highlights two important findings. First, Al-Shabaab was initially inclined toward dialogue but, following the death and defection of senior members, increasingly adopted an anti-negotiation stance. Second, whilst Al-Shabaab is obstinately refusing any dialogue on the macrolevel, at the microlevel, the group indirectly negotiates with the FGS and other actors using clan elders as interlocutors and facilitators. Finally, the article explores the idea that, instead of relying on foreign third-party mediators to resolve Somalia's protracted stalemate at the macrolevel, clan elders, as credible insider-partial mediators possessing locally sourced legitimacy and perceived integrity, have the capacity to help overcome the stalemate between Al-Shabaab and the FGS.

摘要

自2015年以来，青年党和索马里联邦政府（FGS）陷入了长期僵持的暴力僵局。青年党拒绝进行任何对话的提议，没有任何动力寻求政治解决。本文从和平与冲突文学的理论观点以及对氏族长老和青年党叛逃者的主要访谈中汲取了经验，探讨了两个相互关联的主题。首先，青年党成立以来青年对话的积极态度；第二，宗族长老如何在青年党和FGS之间进行微观层面的谈判，扮演各种寻求和平的角色。本文重点介绍了两个重要发现。首先，青年党最初倾向于对话，但是在高级成员死亡和叛变之后，越来越多地采取反谈判立场。第二，青年党固执地拒绝在宏观层面上进行任何对话，而在微观层面上，该团体利用宗族长者作为对话者和促进者，间接与FGS和其他参与者进行谈判。最后，文章探讨了这样的想法：氏族长者不是可靠的内部人-局部调解人，他们拥有本地来源的合法性和公认的诚信，而不是依靠外国第三方调解人在宏观水平上解决长期僵持的僵局，而是有能力帮助克服青年党与FGS之间的僵局。