ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the role of sectarian identity in foreign policy making by bringing sub-state sectarian actors into foreign policy studies. The paper takes Lebanon and the Syrian Civil War as a case study through a close scrutiny of the emergence and the consolidation of foreign policy orientations, preferences and behaviour of the Maronite, Sunni, Shia and Druze leaders in Lebanon. By doing so, it asks how sectarian groups behave as sub-state foreign policy actors in countries where society is divided along sectarian identities and how sectarian identities matter in terms of the definition of the self and the other and the ally and the enemy in weak states. It further questions to what extent sectarian groups can be considered as sub-state foreign policy actors with their own perceptions based on their identities. Building its main findings on various fieldworks in Lebanon conducted in 2016 and 2017, interviewing leaders of major sects; this study concludes that in the absence of a cohesive foreign policy stance in a weak state, the role of sectarian identity in defining self and other becomes central for understanding the foreign policy choices of sectarian leaders faced with an existential challenge.

抽象的

通过将次国家宗派行动者带入外交政策研究，分析宗派身份在外交政策制定中的作用。本文通过仔细审查黎巴嫩马龙派，逊尼派，什叶派和德鲁兹领导人的出现和巩固其外交政策取向，偏好和行为，以黎巴嫩和叙利亚内战为案例。通过这样做，它询问了在社会按照宗派身份而分裂的国家中，宗派群体如何作为次国家的外交政策行为者，以及宗派身份如何根据自我和他人以及弱者中的盟友和敌人的定义而发挥作用。状态。它进一步质疑宗派团体在多大程度上可以被视为次国家外交政策行为者，他们具有基于自身身份的看法。根据2016年和2017年在黎巴嫩进行的各种田野调查，得出主要结论，采访主要宗派的领导人; 这项研究得出的结论是，在弱势国家中缺乏统一的外交政策立场的情况下，宗派身份在界定自我和他人身份方面的作用对于理解面临生存挑战的宗派领袖的外交政策选择至关重要。