Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.

先前的研究表明，享有较高声誉的分析师在市场上具有影响力。本文研究了经理在制定自愿披露策略时是否考虑了分析师的声誉。使用《机构投资者》杂志的全美（AA）排名来代替分析师的声誉，我们发现，机管局分析师的报道范围与季度管理收入预测（MEF）的可能性呈正相关。我们还发现，当公司被AA分析师覆盖时，AA分析师的乐观预测与MEF的可能性正相关，而不是非AA分析师的乐观预测。基于AA分析员覆盖率变化和AA状态变化的分析确定了分析员声誉与MEF之间的关系。我们进一步发现，分析师的声誉会影响其他MEF属性，例如预测新闻，偏见，和修订，并且我们的结果对于替代分析师声誉的衡量方法是可靠的。进一步的分析表明，当公司达到/超越（错过）AA分析师的预测时，季度收益公告中的市场反应要比当公司达到/超过（错过）非AA分析师的预测时的市场反应更为积极（负面）。总体而言，我们的发现表明，经理人员应考虑到跟随其公司的个人分析师的声誉，从战略上提供自愿性预测。