This paper examines corporate governance (CG) and corporate accountability practices in the African context, by focusing on the case of Kenya. Our data comprises a combination of 29 semi-structured interviews, field observations and archival evidence. We reveal how western-originated CG and accountability reforms are constrained or subverted by a vigorous neo-patrimonial regime. The Kenyan corporate sector has well defined legal-rational structures, including an elaborate corporate sector regulatory framework, professionals (i.e. accountants and auditors) and corporate boards. In contrast, however, informal networks and patronage interfere with the nomination and work of non-executive board members, thereby hindering the possibility of an independent monitoring of executive management. A conflictual and inadequately resourced regulatory framework plays a more symbolic than an effective regulative role in enforcing CG and accountability practices. We also find a widespread rent-seeking culture that significantly hinders the exercise of corporate accountability. Furthermore, external auditor independence is problematic due to conflicts of interest and the auditors’ dependence on advisory fees, thereby favouring a clientelist association with auditee firms. Overall, our findings reveal that CG and accountability practices, while ostensibly present in Kenya, are largely ineffective due to the influence of neo-patrimonial realities on the mind-set and actions of corporate actors.

本文通过关注肯尼亚的案例，研究了非洲背景下的公司治理 (CG) 和公司问责实践。我们的数据包括 29 次半结构化访谈、实地观察和档案证据的组合。我们揭示了源自西方的公司治理和问责制改革如何受到充满活力的新世袭制度的约束或颠覆。肯尼亚公司部门具有明确的法律合理结构，包括精心设计的公司部门监管框架、专业人员（即会计师和审计师）和公司董事会。然而，相比之下，非正式网络和赞助会干扰非执行董事会成员的提名和工作，从而阻碍对执行管理层进行独立监督的可能性。冲突和资源不足的监管框架在执行企业管治和问责实践方面比有效的监管作用更具象征意义。我们还发现普遍存在的寻租文化严重阻碍了企业问责制的行使。此外，由于利益冲突和审计师依赖咨询费，外部审计师的独立性存在问题，从而有利于与被审计公司的客户协会。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，虽然肯尼亚表面上存在企业管治和问责实践，但由于新世袭现实对企业行为者的思维定势和行为的影响，在很大程度上是无效的。