This study examines whether and how audit quality affects a firm's technological innovation. Using a sample of 7,482 U.S. firms between 2000 and 2009, we demonstrate that high audit quality is associated with lower innovation output, measured by patent counts and patent citations. The effect remains valid after a series of tests for endogeneity issues, alternative measures of audit quality, and different subsamples. We also find that firms with high audit quality attract more non-dedicated institutional investors and financial analysts, who often exert excessive pressure on managers for short-term performance. These pressures, in turn, exacerbate managerial myopia and lead them to forgo investments in innovation. Our findings provide new insights into audit quality by showing its undesirable, most likely unintended, consequences.

这项研究检查了审计质量是否以及如何影响公司的技术创新。我们使用2000年至2009年间的7,482家美国公司作为样本，我们证明，高审计质量与较低的创新产出相关联，这可以通过专利计数和专利引用来衡量。在对内生性问题，审计质量的替代度量以及不同的子样本进行了一系列测试之后，该效果仍然有效。我们还发现，具有高审计质量的公司吸引了更多的非专用机构投资者和财务分析师，他们常常对经理的短期业绩施加过大压力。这些压力反过来加剧了管理型近视，并导致他们放弃了对创新的投资。通过显示审计质量的不良后果（很可能是意料之外的结果），我们的发现为审计质量提供了新的见解。