We find that federal bureaucrats award more, larger, and less risky contracts to politically connected firms when they have greater discretion over contracting outcomes. Using a sample of 4.3 million federal government contract actions obligating $2.47 trillion between 2000 and 2015, we show that this result varies predictably across contract and agency characteristics, over time, and in placebo tests, and is robust to a comprehensive fixed effect structure and seven alternate measures of political connectedness. Our evidence illustrates the overlooked role of the bureaucrat in facilitating political bias in federal contracting outcomes.

中文翻译：

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官僚的自由裁量权和契约结果

我们发现，当联邦官僚们对合同结果有更大的自由度时，他们会向政治上有联系的公司授予更多，更大，风险更低的合同。我们使用了2000年至2015年间430万笔联邦政府合同行为的样本，涉及2.47万亿美元，我们发现，随着时间的推移，在安慰剂测试中，该结果在合同和代理机构特征之间可预测地变化，并且对于全面的固定效应结构和七政治联系的替代措施。我们的证据表明，官僚在促进联邦签约结果中的政治偏见方面被忽略了。