Andreas Schmidt argues that ethicists have misplaced moral qualms about nudges insofar as their worries are about whether nudges treat us as rational agents, because nudges often enhance our rational agency. I think that Schmidt is right that nudges often enhance our rational agency; in fact, we can carry his conclusion further: nudges often enhance our self-governing agency too. But this does not alleviate our worries that nudges fail to treat us as rational. This is shown by disambiguating two conceptions of treating-as-rational. The more plausible conception of treating-as-rational undermines Schmidt’s case that nudges often treat us as rational.

中文翻译：

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推动理性和自治

安德烈亚斯·施密特 (Andreas Schmidt) 认为，伦理学家对轻推的道德疑虑是错误的，因为他们担心轻推是否将我们视为理性的代理人，因为轻推通常会增强我们的理性能动性。我认为施密特是正确的，即轻推通常会增强我们的理性能动性；事实上，我们可以进一步推论他的结论：助推通常也能增强我们的自治机构。但这并不能减轻我们对轻推未能将我们视为理性的担忧。这可以通过消除两个理性对待概念的歧义来证明。将我们视为理性的更合理的概念削弱了施密特的案例，即轻推通常将我们视为理性。