The complexity of understanding and navigating human–nature relations calls for diverse angles of philosophical approach, and the articles in this issue exemplify that diversity, engaging questions of ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics and epistemology. They are connected, however, by a thread that runs through environmental philosophy: a desire to broaden or reframe understandings of humans’ places in, perceptions of, and obligations to the natural world. Relatedly, each of the contributions can be seen as an effort to push beyond narrow forms of anthropocentrism: Jake Monaghan defends biocentric individualism against a key objection; Yasha Rowher considers the potential implications of taking seriously obligations to prevent extinction and biodiversity loss; Fernando Arribas Herguedas seeks to extend Allen Carlson’s environmental aesthetics to agricultural landscapes; and Roope Oskari Kaaronen draws on process philosophy and the epistemology of Michael Polanyi to reconceptualise humans’ place in nature. What is striking about these contributions are the distinct ways in which they develop non-anthropocentric environmental philosophies1: whereas early discussions of non-anthropocentrism focused heavily on questions of intrinsic value, those questions do not dominate the discussion here, and there is significant attention to implications and applications in contemporary contexts. Monaghan’s article cleaves most closely to traditional debates, seeking to support the view that any living thing can have interests, and thereby, intrinsic value. Monaghan defends biocentric individualism by arguing that all living things have interests; this is because all living things are susceptible to death, which is an intrinsic bad. On this view, having interests does not require sentience, nor does it depend on desires. Monaghan also sidesteps controversial ethical debates over the concept of harm. He argues simply (p. 123): 1. Death is a prima facie harm; 2. Harm is a setback of interests; 3. Non-minded creatures can die; 4. So, non-minded creatures can be harmed; 5. So, non-minded creatures have interests.

中文翻译：

---

非人类中心主义的多样性：责任、美、知识和现实

理解和驾驭人与自然关系的复杂性需要不同角度的哲学方法，本期文章体现了这种多样性，涉及伦理学、美学、形而上学和认识论的问题。然而，它们通过一条贯穿环境哲学的线索联系在一起：希望扩大或重新构建对人类在自然世界中的位置、感知和义务的理解。相关地，每一项贡献都可以被视为超越狭隘形式的人类中心主义的努力：杰克·莫纳汉捍卫生物中心主义的个人主义，反对一个关键的反对意见；Yasha Rowher 考虑了认真履行防止灭绝和生物多样性丧失义务的潜在影响；Fernando Arribas Herguedas 试图将 Allen Carlson 的环境美学扩展到农业景观；和 Roope Oskari Kaaronen 借鉴过程哲学和 Michael Polanyi 的认识论来重新概念化人类在自然界中的位置。这些贡献的惊人之处在于它们发展非人类中心主义环境哲学的独特方式1：虽然早期关于非人类中心主义的讨论主要集中于内在价值的问题，但这些问题并没有主导这里的讨论，并且非常关注在当代语境中的意义和应用。莫纳汉的文章最贴近传统辩论，试图支持任何生物都可以拥有利益，从而拥有内在价值的观点。莫纳汉通过论证所有生物都有利益来捍卫以生物为中心的个人主义；这是因为所有生物都容易死亡，这是一种内在的坏处。依此看来，有兴趣不需知觉，亦不依欲。莫纳汉还回避了有关伤害概念的有争议的伦理辩论。他简单地论证了 (p. 123)： 1. 死亡是一种表面上的伤害；2.伤害是利益的挫折；3.无心的生物会死；4. 因此，无意识的生物可能会受到伤害；5. 所以，无心的生物有兴趣。他简单地论证了 (p. 123)： 1. 死亡是一种表面上的伤害；2.伤害是利益的挫折；3.无心的生物会死；4. 因此，无意识的生物可能会受到伤害；5. 所以，无心的生物有兴趣。他简单地论证了 (p. 123)： 1. 死亡是一种表面上的伤害；2.伤害是利益的挫折；3.无心的生物会死；4. 因此，无意识的生物可能会受到伤害；5. 所以，无心的生物有兴趣。