By the start of the twentieth century, the two organizational forms most used by Dutch banks to raise capital through the dispersal of their ownership were the cooperative association and the public company. Share ownership in cooperatives was typically restricted to customers, while companies permitted outside investors. Neither organizational form dictated specific shareholder liability arrangements. New specialist banks targeting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) combined these two organizational forms and flexible liability rules to create hybrid forms. I find those that took the public company form were more likely to suffer distress during the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s. Liability arrangements for shareholders, by contrast, had a negligible impact on these banks’ resilience.

中文翻译：

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银行韧性的组织决定因素：解释中小企业银行在 1920 年代荷兰金融危机中的表现

到 20 世纪初，荷兰银行通过分散所有权来筹集资金最常用的两种组织形式是合作社和上市公司。合作社的股份所有权通常仅限于客户，而公司则允许外部投资者。两种组织形式都没有规定具体的股东责任安排。针对中小企业（SME）的新型专业银行将这两种组织形式和灵活的责任规则结合起来，创造出混合形式。我发现那些采取上市公司形式的公司更有可能在 1920 年代荷兰金融危机期间遭受困境。相比之下，股东的责任安排对这些银行的韧性影响微乎其微。