Under an often employed imitation mechanism, we investigate whether countries with different emission abatement benefits and costs can achieve an international environmental agreement. When the abatement efficiencies, ancillary benefits of abatement, and/or the numbers of countries are large, an international environmental agreement with full participation is the unique long-run equilibrium. For the remaining situations, either no agreement is the unique equilibrium or both equilibria above can emerge with positive probability. These results hold whatever the function forms of countries' abatement costs are, whether the transboundary pollution of emissions is considered, and whether the mutation rates depend on abatement costs and time.

中文翻译：

---

模仿与不对称国家演化机制下的国际环境协定

在一个经常使用的模仿机制下，我们调查具有不同减排收益和成本的国家是否可以达成国际环境协议。当减排效率、减排的辅助效益和/或国家数量很大时，一个充分参与的国际环境协议是独特的长期均衡。对于其余的情况，要么没有一致是唯一的均衡，要么上述两个均衡都以正概率出现。无论国家减排成本的函数形式是什么，是否考虑排放的跨界污染，突变率是否取决于减排成本和时间，这些结果都成立。