We study the interactions between supervisors and workers via evolutionary game-theory. We develop a simple model where workers select their effort level and decide whether to cooperate or defect. Supervisors, in turn, have two different functions: first, they act as coordinators and convert team-effort into output; and second, they act as monitors and induce workers to cooperate. In doing both, they may either behave as “motivators” through charisma and persuasion (authoritative style), or as “punishers” through authority and control (authoritarian style). In our framework, motivators encourage independence-seeking and reward cooperators through inspiration and engagement, while punishers take all relevant decisions and reprehend defectors when these are caught shirking. The message is that authoritative leadership improves both productivity and worker well-being. For this to happen, supervisors must improve their charisma, while workers must develop their decisional skills. When either of these conditions is unmet, a variety of welfare-depressing situations may emerge.

我们通过进化博弈论研究主管与工人之间的互动。我们开发了一个简单的模型，在该模型中，工人可以选择自己的工作水平并决定是否进行合作或存在缺陷。主管则具有两个不同的功能：首先，他们充当协调员，将团队努力转化为产出。其次，他们充当监督者，并促使工人合作。在这两种情况下，他们要么通过魅力和说服力（权威风格）充当“动机”，要么通过权威和控制（威权主义风格）充当“惩罚者”。在我们的框架中，激励者鼓励寻求独立的人，并通过鼓舞和参与来奖励合作者，而惩罚者则做出所有相关的决定，当叛逃者被推卸时应予以谴责。传达的信息是，权威性领导既可以提高生产率，也可以改善工人的福利。为此，主管必须提高他们的魅力，而工人必须提高决策能力。当这些条件中的任何一个都不满足时，可能会出现各种降低福利的情况。