In the context of Bayesian Persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow in Am Econ Rev 101:2590–2615, 2011), typically, a biased Sender designs a signal to influence the binary decision of an unbiased Receiver. Can the Receiver improve her payoffs by adopting a resistance strategy, i.e., by committing into incurring (deterministic or stochastic) costs if she picks the Sender-preferred action? We argue that deterministic resistance strategies cannot improve the Receiver’s payoffs, whereas stochastic resistance strategies can increase both the informativeness of the signal and the Receiver’s payoffs. We fully characterize the optimal resistance strategy and show that it always induces a substantial increase in the Receiver’s welfare, as well as a perfectly informative signal.

在贝叶斯说服力的背景下（Kamenica和Gentzkow在Am Econ Rev 101：2590–2615，2011年），通常，有偏见的发送者会设计一个信号来影响无偏见接收者的二进制决策。如果接收方选择了发件人首选的操作，接收方是否可以通过采取抵制策略来提高收益，即承诺承担（确定性或随机性）成本？我们认为确定性抵抗策略不能提高接收者的收益，而随机抵抗策略可以增加信号的信息性和接收者的收益。我们充分地描述了最佳抵抗策略的特征，并表明它始终会导致接收者的福利大大提高，并提供了一个非常有用的信号。