In a simple model where agents’ monetary payoffs are uncertain, this paper examines the aggregation of subjective expected utility functions which are interpersonally noncomparable. A maximin social welfare criterion is derived from axioms of efficiency, ex post equity, and social rationality, combined with the independence of beliefs and risk preferences in riskless situations (Chambers and Echenique in Games Econ Behav 76:582–595, 2012). The criterion compares allocations by the values of the prospects composed of the statewise minimum payoffs evaluated by the certainty equivalents. Because of this construction, the criterion is egalitarian and risk averse.

在不确定代理商的货币收益的简单模型中，本文研究了人与人之间不可比的主观预期效用函数的集合。最大化的社会福利标准源自效率，事后公平和社会理性的公理，并结合了无风险情况下的信念和风险偏好的独立性（Chambers和Echenique在Games Econ Behav 76：582–595，2012）。该标准通过由确定性等值评估的州最小收益构成的前景值来比较分配。由于这种构造，标准是平等主义和规避风险。