The assertion of territorial claims is one of the longest standing political issues in the world and, as the number of ongoing disputes shows, has lost none of its significance in contemporary times. Humans long for a place they can call “theirs”: whether that involves an individual being able to have a “room of one’s own” (Woolf, 1929) within a household, or being able to control the behavior of people within certain spaces and the movement of goods and people across them. Although claims to land and to territory have always featured in political philosophy, in the last decade there has been increased interest in the subject. Classic liberal political philosophy conceived of rights to territory largely as, or at least evolved from, property rights. The more recent work, to which Anna Stilz’s thought‐provoking book is a very welcome contribution, allows that there might be better ways of conceiving of people’s relationships to land and to territory than in terms of property, or at the very least not in terms of “full liberal ownership”.^{1 1} The territorial turn began with Avery Kolers (2009) and Cara Nine (2012). See also Margaret Moore (2015).

It is not possible to do justice to any, let alone all of Stilz’s ideas in the space of a short commentary. Instead, I consider what Stilz’s theory has to say about how to conceive of and respond to the phenomenon of global climate change. This might seem strange to people who conceive of climate change entirely as a matter of what is going on in the atmosphere. However, climate change will not only have potentially severe impacts upon the land surface, but might, if unchecked lead to certain states, namely some of the Small Island States (SISs) losing their territory due to sea level rise. Moreover, significant proportions of the earth’s carbon sinks are located in the land and seas of different countries. To keep atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) at a manageable level, it is necessary to maintain (even create) carbon sink capacity as well as to reduce GHG emissions (e.g., by reducing fossil fuel consumption). Indeed, Stilz devotes some time in her book to both these issues. Chapter 6 discusses the rights of SISs should they become uninhabitable, and chapter 8 is devoted to management of carbon sinks. The latter half of this commentary will focus on this discussion of forest management. Before then, I wish to propose an extension to Stilz’s basic theory. In this first half of this commentary, I will suggest that as well as the “right of occupancy,” the interest in “located life plans” justifies a second pre‐institutional right. I will call this the right against nonspatial removal (right against NSR).^{2 2} “Place identity” and “place attachment” have long been researched in human geography, environmental psychology, and architecture. Stilz has largely eschewed these terms in her work, but it seems she is appealing to something akin to them by her discussion of “located life plans.” For an interdisciplinary overview of research on place identity and place attachment, see the contributions to Lanzo and Devine‐Wright (2014).
The case for this right begins in the next section.

对领土主张的主张是世界上存在时间最长的政治问题之一，而且，正如不断发生的争端所表明的那样，在当代并没有失去任何意义。人们渴望一个可以称其为“他们的地方”的地方：是否涉及一个人能够拥有“自己的房间”（伍尔夫，1929年）），或者能够控制特定空间内人员的行为以及货物和人员在其中的移动。尽管对土地和领土的主张一直是政治哲学的特征，但是在过去的十年中，人们对这一主题的兴趣日益浓厚。经典的自由主义政治哲学主要是将财产权作为财产权或至少从财产权演变而来。安娜·斯蒂尔斯（Anna Stilz）的发人深省的著作对它的最新著作是非常值得欢迎的贡献，它允许人们比财产，或者至少至少不是财产，有更好的方法来构想人们与土地和领土的关系。 “完全自由的所有权”。^{1个 1} 领土的转折始于Avery Kolers（ 2009）和Cara Nine（ 2012）。另见玛格丽特·摩尔（Margaret Moore）（ 2015年）。

不可能对任何人伸张正义，更不用说简短评论，更不用说斯蒂尔兹的所有观点了。相反，我考虑了斯迪尔兹（Stilz）的理论关于如何构想和应对全球气候变化现象的看法。对于完全将气候变化视为大气中情况的人们而言，这似乎有些奇怪。但是，气候变化不仅会对陆地表面造成潜在的严重影响，而且如果不受制止，可能会导致某些州，即某些小岛国（SIS）由于海平面上升而失去其领土。此外，地球碳汇的很大一部分位于不同国家的陆地和海洋中。为了使大气中的温室气体浓度保持在可管理的水平，必须维持（甚至创造）碳汇能力，并减少温室气体排放（例如，通过减少化石燃料的消耗）。实际上，斯蒂尔兹在她的书中花了一些时间来解决这两个问题。第6章讨论了SIS不能使用时的权利，第8章专门讨论碳汇的管理。本评论的后半部分将重点讨论森林管理。在此之前，我希望提出对Stilz基本理论的扩展。在本评论的前半部分，我将建议，除了“居住权”之外，对“定居生活计划”的关注也证明了第二种机构前权利是正当的。我将其称为反对非空间删除的权利（反对NSR的权利）。Stilz在她的书中花了一些时间解决这两个问题。第6章讨论了SIS不能使用时的权利，第8章专门讨论碳汇的管理。本评论的后半部分将重点讨论森林管理。在此之前，我希望提出对Stilz基本理论的扩展。在本评论的上半部分，我将建议，除了“居住权”之外，对“定居生活计划”的关注还可以证明第二种机构前权利是正当的。我将其称为反对非空间删除的权利（反对NSR的权利）。Stilz在她的书中花了一些时间解决这两个问题。第6章讨论了SIS不能使用时的权利，第8章专门讨论碳汇的管理。本评论的后半部分将重点讨论森林管理。在此之前，我希望提出对Stilz基本理论的扩展。在本评论的前半部分，我将建议，除了“居住权”之外，对“定居生活计划”的关注也证明了第二种机构前权利是正当的。我将其称为反对非空间删除的权利（反对NSR的权利）。我想提出对斯蒂尔兹基本理论的扩展。在本评论的前半部分，我将建议，除了“居住权”之外，对“定居生活计划”的关注也证明了第二种机构前权利是正当的。我将其称为反对非空间删除的权利（反对NSR的权利）。我想提出对斯蒂尔兹基本理论的扩展。在本评论的前半部分，我将建议，除了“居住权”之外，对“定居生活计划”的关注也证明了第二种机构前权利是正当的。我将其称为反对非空间删除的权利（反对NSR的权利）。^{2个 2} 在人类地理学，环境心理学和建筑学方面，“场所身份”和“场所依恋”已有很长的研究历史。Stilz在工作中基本上避开了这些用语，但似乎她在讨论“定居的生活计划”时正在寻求与这些用语相似的东西。有关场所身份和场所依恋研究的跨学科概述，请参见对Lanzo和Devine-Wright（ 2014）的贡献。
此权利的情况将从下一部分开始。