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Beyond Claim-Rights: Social Structure, Collectivization, and Human Rights
Journal of Social Philosophy ( IF 1.063 ) Pub Date : 2020-06-25 , DOI: 10.1111/josp.12362
Elizabeth Kahn

1 Introduction

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights identifies a range of requirements that its authors agreed should be met for every human, out of respect for their inherent dignity (United Nations General Assembly 1948). Since the Declaration, the term “human right” has been used to identify particularly significant, normative requirements of universal concern that should be met for individuals everywhere, which should take priority over most other moral and political concerns. Yet many philosophical accounts of the concept of a “right” struggle to accommodate all of the requirement identified in the Declaration. These accounts take human rights to be Hohfeldian claim-rights: claims to action or omission owed by some agent (or agents) to the right holder, such that the fulfillment of the correlative duty (or duties) constitutes the fulfillment of the right (Hohfeld 1913, 32; O'Neill 2005, 430, Cruft 2012, 137, Collins 2016, 701). When understood to be interpersonal claim-rights, the difficulty comes in identifying which persons have the correlative duties (O'Neill 2005), whereas when understood to be claim-rights held by each individual against their own government, the problem is that many governments lack the ability to fulfill all of these claims for all of their residents (Cranston 1983).

In response to these difficulties, this paper argues that human rights should not be understood to be Hohfeldian claim-rights (Hohfeld 1913) and instead proposes the adoption of an account of the concept that does not tie these rights directly to duties owed to the rights holder. According to this account, recognizing certain requirements to be a matter of human rights entails two things. First, that the importance of the individual interests that these requirements protect is sufficient to justify governing agencies prioritizing the social guarantee of these standards over most other concerns. Second, that the importance of meeting these standards equally for every contemporary person is sufficient to justify weighty pro-tanto duties on all moral agents to make considerable efforts to achieve and maintain a sociopolitical order in which they are socially guaranteed for everyone.1 1 Building on Shue (1988 and 1996).
It is noted that such an approach can include social structural standards as human rights requirements: recognizing a subset of the requirements of structural justice that are of particular moral significance, warrant universal concern, take relative priority, and should be socially guaranteed equally for individuals everywhere due to their inherent dignity.

The paper makes two points in favor of this understanding of human rights over Hohfeldian claim-right approaches. First, the approach recommended here can include all of the human rights recognized in the Declaration and thus does a better job of reflecting how the term is used in contemporary times. Second, the account does not lead to the exclusion of human rights that it will take collectivization to achieve for all humans in contemporary times.2 2 For a definition of collectivization, see Collins (2013).
Thus, the account proposed here avoids restricting what can be recognized as a particularly significant, normative requirement of universal concern that should be socially guaranteed for individuals everywhere, and which should take relative priority over most other concerns (the role that human rights have come to play in contemporary discourse) on the basis of what can currently be achieved for every contemporary human without the development of new agencies.

The paper challenges those who favor a Hohfeldian claim-right approach to human rights to take up one of the following options. First option: adapt their account so as to be able to recognize important individualistically justified priorities of justice that at present require collectivization to be fulfilled for all contemporary humans. Second option: come up with a justification for the prioritization of the individualistically justified requirements of justice their accounts do recognize over basic requirements of social justice, that should be secured for individuals everywhere, that currently require collectivization to be achieved for every contemporary human.

1.1 Preliminaries

This paper considers how the concept of a human right should be understood: what it means to claim that something is a human right and what role these claims should play in normative reasoning. The grounds on which something can be established to be a human right are deliberately left open: the paper does not seek to explain the form that a justification of a human right must take.3 3 Although the concept and grounds of human rights should be combined in full accounts of human rights, it is my contention that they can be disentangled (in keeping with Tasioulas 2012). The paper notes that the declaration appeals to the idea of “inherent dignity” to distinguish human rights. However, it does not explore how to identify which rights are a matter of inherent dignity.

It is human rights as moral rights rather than legal rights that this paper is concerned with. The Universal Declaration is interpreted as aiming to identify pre-existing moral rights that are not dependent on a particular legal convention for their validity (in keeping with Raz 2010; Collins 2016).

The criteria used to evaluate the concept of a human right in this paper will now be given. The aim of this paper is to come up with a morally appealing concept that can make sense of the Declaration and contemporary discourse, hence fidelity is identified as a virtue. However, this does not exclude the possibility that a philosophical conceptualization of the concept of a “human right” can require some reform of how the term is currently used (following Tasioulas 2012). In addition, an account of the concept must be consistent (not internally contradictory) and morally plausible (must give intuitive rulings with regard to what constitutes the violation of a human right, and so on). Finally, the concept must have some valuable role to play in our normative discourse and social practices (utility).

1.2 Structure

The paper begins by offering evidence that the term “human right” is currently used to identify particularly significant, normative requirements of universal concern that should be met for individuals everywhere, and which should take priority over most other moral and political concerns. It then outlines how, in philosophical literature, human rights are often taken to be universal Hohfedian claim-rights. Sections 4 and 5 outline interpersonal and governmental Hohfeldian claim-right accounts of the concept, respectively, and note the difficulties they face in recognizing all of the human rights identified in the Declaration.

Sections 2-5 together argue that, given the current usage of the term, accepting either of these Hohfeldian claim-right accounts results in the restriction of the list of particularly significant, normative requirements of universal concern that should be met for individuals everywhere (out of respect for their inherent dignity), which should take priority over most other moral and political concerns. These sections suggest that if having adequately specifiable correlative duties—the fulfillment of which constitutes the fulfillment of the right—is an existence condition for a human right (as the Hohfeldian Claim-Right account suggests), we must reject a large number of the human rights listed in the Declaration and Covenants.4 4 Unless we adopt a more complex Hohfeldian claim-right account that is different to the interpersonal and governmental approaches explored here.
5 5 Some constitutional and legal human rights as well as many socioeconomic human rights must be rejected under the interpersonal and governmental accounts. This point was helpfully drawn to my attention by an anonymous reviewer.

In response to this problem, it is then proposed that instead of rejecting many of the human rights currently recognized (as O’Neill 2005 recommends) the idea that human rights must be Hohfeldian claim-rights should be rejected (contra Cranston, O'Neill, Tomalty, Cruft and Collins). The paper then suggests that we understand human rights to be particularly significant, individualistically justified, requirements of justice which take priority over most other normative concerns. According to this account, stating that meeting these standards is a matter of human rights involves two claims. First, it means that the significance of the interests that these requirements protect for every contemporary human is sufficient to justify governing agents prioritizing the social guarantee of these standards for everyone. Second, that meeting these requirements for every contemporary person is important enough to justify demanding that other moral agents make considerable efforts to secure and maintain a sociopolitical order in which these standards are socially guaranteed.6 6 The account endorsed here, has much in common with those proposed by Ashford (2006) and Shue (1996). Ashford’s suggests that we recognize positive and imperfect duties with regard to human rights. Adopting her account requires a different understanding of the relationship between rights and duties to the claim-rights approach.

It is then noted that such an understanding allows us to include as human rights, standards that currently require coordinated action to be achieved for all contemporary humans. It is pointed out that the proposed account is not limited (in the recognition of what individuals should have as a matter of human rights) by the abilities of existing agents acting unilaterally. However, it is noted that it is restricted by what existing agents can be reasonably expected to achieve through coordination and collectivization in the medium term. It is then pointed out that the proposed account can include social structural requirements within human rights: recognizing a subset of demands of social structural justice that are of particular significance, are of universal concern, that should be met equally for individuals everywhere and should take priority over most other moral concerns.7 7 Elizabeth Ashford has proposed there can be structural human rights violations (Ashford 2007)
The relationship between human rights and duties is then explained before the account is defended from objections.



中文翻译:

超越权利要求:社会结构、集体化和人权

1 简介

《世界人权宣言》确定了一系列要求,其作者同意每个人都应满足这些要求,这是出于对他们固有尊严的尊重(联合国大会1948)。自《宣言》以来,“人权”一词已被用于确定特别重要的、普遍关注的规范要求,应为世界各地的个人所满足,这些要求应优先于大多数其他道德和政治问题。然而,许多关于“权利”概念的哲学解释都在为适应《宣言》中确定的所有要求而斗争。这些帐户将人权视为霍菲尔德的主张权利:对某些代理人(或代理人)欠权利人的作为或不作为的主张,使得相关义务(或义务)的履行构成权利的履行(霍菲尔德1913 年,32 名;奥尼尔2005 年,430 名,克鲁夫特2012 年,137 名,柯林斯2016 年, 701)。当被理解为人际请求权时,很难确定哪些人具有相关的义务 (O'Neill 2005 ),而当理解为每个人对自己的政府持有的请求权时,问题在于许多政府缺乏为所有居民实现所有这些要求的能力(Cranston 1983)。

针对这些困难,本文认为不应将人权理解为霍菲尔德式的主张权利(Hohfeld 1913),而是建议采用不直接将这些权利联系起来的概念的解释。对权利人的义务。根据这种说法,承认某些要求是人权问题需要两件事。首先,这些要求保护的个人利益的重要性足以证明管理机构将这些标准的社会保障优先于大多数其他问题。其次,对于每个当代人来说,平等地满足这些标准的重要性足以证明对所有道德主体的重大责任是合理的,以做出相当大的努力来实现和维持一个社会政治秩序,在这种秩序中,他们为每个人提供社会保障。1 1 树上大厦( 1988 年1996 年)。
值得注意的是,这种方法可以将社会结构标准作为人权要求包括在内:承认结构正义要求的一个子集,这些要求具有特殊的道德意义,需要普遍关注,具有相对优先级,并且应该为世界各地的个人提供平等的社会保障由于他们与生俱来的尊严。

本文提出两点支持这种对人权的理解,而不是霍菲尔德的主张权利方法。首先,这里推荐的方法可以包括《宣言》中承认的所有人权,从而更好地反映该术语在当代的使用方式。其次,这种解释并没有导致对当代所有人类需要集体化才能实现的人权的排斥。2 2 关于集体化的定义,参见 Collins ( 2013 )。
因此,这里提出的说明避免限制可以被认为是普遍关注的特别重要的规范性要求,该要求应该为世界各地的个人提供社会保障,并且应该相对于大多数其他关注(人权已经成为在当代话语中发挥作用)基于目前每个当代人可以实现的目标,而无需发展新的机构。

该文件挑战那些支持霍菲尔德主张权利的人权方法的人选择以下选项之一。第一个选择:调整他们的解释,以便能够认识到重要的个人主义正义优先事项,目前需要集体化才能为所有当代人类实现。第二种选择:提出一个理由来优先考虑他们的账户确实承认的社会正义的基本要求,即社会正义的基本要求,这些要求应该为世界各地的个人提供保障,目前需要为每个当代人类实现集体化。

1.1 预赛

本文考虑了应如何理解人权的概念:声称某事是人权意味着什么以及这些主张在规范推理中应发挥什么作用。可以将某事确定为人权的理由是故意公开的:本文并不试图解释为人权辩护必须采取的形式。3 3 虽然人权的概念和依据应该结合起来充分考虑人权,但我的观点是它们可以分开(与 Tasioulas 2012 一致)。该文件指出,该宣言诉诸“固有尊严”的概念来区分人权。然而,它没有探讨如何确定哪些权利是固有尊严的问题。

本文关注的是作为精神权利的人权,而不是法律权利。《世界宣言》被解释为旨在确定不依赖于特定法律公约有效性的预先存在的精神权利(与 Raz 2010 一致;Collins 2016)。

现在将给出用于评估本文中人权概念的标准。本文的目的是提出一个具有道德吸引力的概念,该概念可以理解《宣言》和当代话语,因此忠诚被确定为一种美德。然而,这并不排除“人权”概念的哲学概念化可能需要对该术语目前的使用方式进行一些改革(遵循 Tasioulas 2012)。此外,对概念的描述必须是一致的(不是内部矛盾的)并且在道德上是合理的(必须对构成侵犯人权的行为做出直观的裁决,等等)。最后,这个概念必须在我们的规范话语和社会实践(效用)中发挥一些有价值的作用。

1.2 结构

该文件首先提供了证据,表明“人权”一词目前用于确定特别重要的、普遍关注的规范要求,这些要求应该为世界各地的个人所满足,并且应该优先于大多数其他道德和政治问题。然后概述了在哲学文献中,人权如何经常被视为普遍的 Hohfedian 主张权利。第 4 节和第 5 节分别概述了人际和政府霍费尔德对这一概念的主张权说明,并指出了他们在承认宣言中确定的所有人权方面面临的困难。

第 2-5 节共同论证,鉴于该术语的当前用法,接受这些霍菲尔德主张权利的解释中的任何一个都会导致限制特别重要的、普遍关注的规范性要求的清单,这些要求应该为各地的个人(外尊重他们固有的尊严),这应该优先于大多数其他道德和政治问题。这些部分表明,如果具有充分可说明的相关义务——履行这些义务构成了权利的履行——是人权的存在条件(正如霍菲尔德的权利主张所表明的那样),我们必须拒绝大量的人类《宣言》和《公约》中列出的权利。4 4 除非我们采用更复杂的霍菲尔德主张权利解释,它不同于这里探讨的人际关系和政府方法。
5 5 一些宪法和法律人权以及许多社会经济人权必须在人际和政府账户下被拒绝。一位匿名审稿人帮助我注意到了这一点。

针对这个问题,有人提议与其拒绝许多目前公认的人权(如 O'Neill 2005建议)人权必须是霍菲尔德式的主张权利的想法应该被拒绝(反对克兰斯顿、奥尼尔、托马尔蒂、克鲁夫特和柯林斯)。然后,该文件表明,我们认为人权是特别重要的、个人化的正义要求,优先于大多数其他规范问题。根据这个说法,说明满足这些标准是一个人权问题涉及两个要求。首先,这意味着这些要求保护的每个当代人的利益的重要性足以证明管理机构优先考虑这些标准对每个人的社会保障是合理的。第二,6 6 这里认可的说明与 Ashford ( 2006 ) 和 Shue ( 1996 )提出的观点有很多共同之处。阿什福德建议我们承认在人权方面的积极和不完善的义务。采用她的帐户需要对权利和义务之间的关系有不同的理解,以主张权利方法。

然后指出,这种理解使我们能够将目前需要为所有当代人类采取协调行动的标准作为人权包括在内。需要指出的是,提议的帐户不受现有代理人单方面行动能力的限制(承认个人在人权方面应该拥有什么)。然而,值得注意的是,它受到现有代理人在中期通过协调和集体化可以合理预期实现的目标的限制。然后指出,拟议的解释可以包括人权中的社会结构要求:承认具有特殊意义的社会结构正义要求的子集,是普遍关注的,7 7 伊丽莎白·阿什福德 (Elizabeth Ashford) 提出可能存在结构性侵犯人权行为 (Ashford 2007 )
然后解释人权与义务之间的关系,然后再针对反对意见进行辩护。

更新日期:2020-06-25
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