We examine the Securities and Exchange Commission's assertion in the pay ratio disclosure rule that the ratio of Chief Executive Officer to employee pay is useful to shareholders for say‐on‐pay (SOP) voting decisions. Using an estimated pay ratio for a broad panel of commercial banks from 2010 to 2017, we find that voting dissent on SOP proposals is significantly higher in the top pay ratio decile, particularly when institutional ownership is high. Results are robust to controlling for a number of other determinants of voting dissent, including proxy advisor recommendations and executive compensation. Additionally, inferences using the first year of disclosed pay ratios in 2017 for S&P 1500 firms are consistent. However, we do not find similar results in the other deciles of the pay ratio in either sample, calling into question whether a cost‐benefit analysis would support the disclosure requirement imposed by Dodd‐Frank and implemented by the SEC.

中文翻译：

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注意差距：首席执行官与员工的薪酬比率和股东对薪酬的投票权

我们审查了美国证券交易委员会在薪酬比率披露规则中的主张，即首席执行官与雇员薪酬的比率对股东进行“有薪说”（SOP）投票决策有用。使用2010年至2017年各大商业银行的估计薪酬比率，我们发现最高薪酬比率十分位数对SOP提案的投票异议明显更高，尤其是在机构所有权较高的情况下。结果对于控制投票异议的许多其他决定因素（包括代理顾问的建议和高管薪酬）具有鲁棒性。此外，使用2017年标普1500家公司第一年披露的薪酬比率的推论是一致的。但是，在任何一个样本中，其他比例的薪资比率都没有发现类似的结果，