In this paper, I argue that disabled people have a right to assistive technology (AT), but this right cannot be grounded simply in a broader right to health care or in a more comprehensive view like the capabilities approach to justice. Both of these options are plagued by issues that I refer to as the problem of constriction, where the theory does not justify enough of the AT that disabled people should have access to, and the problem of overextension, where the theory cannot adequately identify an upper limit on the AT that people have a right to. As an alternative to these justificatory frameworks, I argue that disabled people are owed access to AT at the expense of nondisabled people as a matter of compensatory justice. That is, I defend the position that disabled people are owed AT as part of due compensation for the harms they experience from being disadvantaged by society’s dominant cooperative scheme and the violation of their right to equality of opportunity that such disadvantage entails. I also propose a method for identifying an upper limit to what this right to AT requires. In this way, I argue that compensatory justice avoids both the problem of constriction and the problem of overextension.

在本文中，我认为残疾人有权获得辅助技术 (AT)，但这项权利不能仅仅基于更广泛的医疗保健权或更全面的观点，例如实现正义的能力方法。这两种选择都受到我称为“收缩问题”的问题的困扰，该理论不足以证明残疾人应该获得的 AT 以及过度伸展的问题，该理论无法充分确定人们有权使用的 AT 的上限。作为这些正当性框架的替代方案，我认为，作为补偿性正义，残疾人应该以牺牲非残疾人为代价获得 AT。也就是说，我捍卫这样的立场，即残疾人应获得 AT 作为应有补偿的一部分，因为他们因社会占主导地位的合作计划而处于不利地位以及这种不利地位导致他们的机会均等权利受到侵犯而遭受的伤害。我还提出了一种方法来确定这种 AT 权利要求的上限。通过这种方式，我认为补偿性正义避免了收缩问题和过度扩张问题。