Review of Accounting Studies ( IF 4.011 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-06 , DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09569-2 Daniel Aobdia , Saad Siddiqui , Andres Vinelli
We examine the heterogeneity of experts in a credence goods setting. In our analytical model, clients are uncertain about how much effort experts need to provide to solve their problem, which is either simple or difficult. Experts have varying degrees of expertise. Less qualified experts are equally effective at solving simple problems but less effective at solving difficult ones. We show that clients pay a fee premium to more qualified experts, even for simple problems. This premium increases with the probability that the client has a difficult problem. We empirically test the model predictions in the context of partner industry expertise for the U.S. operations of the Big Four audit firms. We find, consistent with the model, a positive association between partner industry specialization and audit fees, even for simple audits, and a negative association between partner specialization and the client’s probability of restatements only for difficult audits. The industry specialization premium is higher in industries with higher proportions of difficult audits. Consistent with credence good agency issues, the specialization premium for simple audits is mitigated when information asymmetry between client and auditor is lower.
中文翻译:
凭证商品设置中专业知识的异质性:来自审计合作伙伴的证据
我们研究了证书商品环境中专家的异质性。在我们的分析模型中,客户不确定专家为解决他们的问题需要付出多少努力,无论是简单还是困难。专家具有不同程度的专业知识。合格的专家在解决简单问题上同样有效,而在解决难题上则没有效果。我们表明,即使是简单的问题,客户也要向更有资格的专家支付额外费用。随着客户遇到难题的可能性的增加,保费增加。我们在合作伙伴行业专业知识的背景下,对四大审计公司在美国的业务进行经验模型检验。根据该模型,我们发现合作伙伴行业的专业化与审计费用之间存在正相关关系,即使是简单的审计,合伙人专业化与客户仅出于困难的审核而重述的可能性之间存在负相关关系。在难以审核的比例较高的行业中,行业专业化溢价较高。与信誉良好的代理机构问题一致,当客户和审计师之间的信息不对称性较低时,可以简化简单审计的专业化费用。