Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are often dubbed as a market for lemons because of the extent of information asymmetry embedded in M&A transactions. A country’s institutional environment influences the quality and overall reliability of formal disclosures, thereby altering the extent of information asymmetry affiliated with an M&A transaction. We argue that the caliber of the host country's institutions—formal market-supporting institutions and the informal cultural institution of uncertainty avoidance—affects the public arbitration phase of M&A transactions, i.e., the phase in which firms attempt to resolve issues related to information asymmetry. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 3376 foreign acquisitions completed by U.S. firms between 2006 and 2016. Our results indicate that formal institutions lower arbitration duration. But, while high uncertainty avoidance lowers duration as expected for countries with low market-supporting institutions, it more strongly raises the duration for countries with high market-supporting institutions.

由于并购交易中信息不对称的程度，并购 (M&A) 通常被称为柠檬市场。一个国家的制度环境会影响正式披露的质量和整体可靠性，从而改变与并购交易相关的信息不对称程度。我们认为东道国机构的能力——正式的市场支持机构和非正式的避免不确定性的文化机构——影响公共仲裁阶段并购交易的阶段，即公司试图解决与信息不对称相关的问题的阶段。我们使用美国公司在 2006 年至 2016 年间完成的 3376 笔海外收购样本来检验我们的假设。我们的结果表明，正规机构缩短了仲裁时间。但是，虽然高度不确定性规避会降低市场支持制度低的国家的久期，但它会更强烈地提高市场支持制度高的国家的久期。