Reviewed by:

• The American Lab: An Insider's History of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by C. Bruce Tarter
• Benjamin Sims (bio)

In The American Lab, former Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory director C. Bruce Tarter provides a detailed history of the laboratory from its origins in the 1950s through 2009. Tarter has done his homework; this is a carefully researched account, citing many primary sources and oral history interviews. While large portions of the book are devoted to administrative details and quick glosses on a plethora of minor projects likely to interest insiders, it nonetheless provides a useful record of an important and understudied institution (Livermore) and time (the late- and post-Cold War periods). While Tarter's early history of the laboratory is comprehensive, the book really comes to life with his account of the political and technical maneuvering that enabled the weapons laboratories to continue to thrive under the rubric of stockpile stewardship following the end of the Cold War. His observations on the transition of nuclear weapons work to a routine and bureaucratic enterprise and the cultural differences between Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories also illuminate the changing roles and influence of these two laboratories between the Cold War era and the present.

Tarter characterizes the relationship between the laboratories as one between an older, established, conservative institution (Los Alamos) and a brash start-up company eager to innovate and make a name for itself (Livermore). Unlike Los Alamos, which emerged out of urgent efforts at a time of national emergency, Livermore's existence was the result of hard-fought [End Page 1238] political and technical battles going back to its main founders, E.O. Lawrence and Edward Teller. In Tarter's account, Livermore was a driver of innovation through the 1960s and 1970s and quickly staked its claim in the nuclear weapons business as an equal partner with Los Alamos, which was largely content to work within existing constraints. Livermore continued to display greater willingness than Los Alamos to engage in political and technical maneuvering to push new and risky projects and concepts, even where technical feasibility had not quite been established. Although this strategy enabled the laboratory to grow, in some cases it led to technical and administrative difficulties. It also contributed to the laboratory's reputation for actively pushing a militaristic, "hardline, anticommunist point of view" that led to public criticism—particularly in relation to missile defense.

Tarter led Livermore from 1994 through 2002, a time period that encompasses the core of the difficult transition of the United States nuclear weapons complex from a Cold War footing, focused on development and testing of nuclear weapons, to a post-Cold War era of diversifying missions and increased bureaucratic oversight. The American Lab provides an engaging account of this period, partly from Tarter's own perspective. It also highlights the role of Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs Vic Reis in the development of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which enabled the weapons laboratories to survive and even prosper after the Cold War. Although Tarter covers many of the other players, Reis appears as an energetic and charismatic force who broke the laboratories' post-Cold War sense of malaise, encouraged new ideas, and laid the groundwork for the future. Tarter might have written a more focused and accessible (if less comprehensive) book had he chosen to cover this period in detail rather than the entire history of the laboratory.

Much of the scholarly work on the nuclear weapons laboratories in the post-Cold War period has been by sociologists and anthropologists, including Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, Hugh Gusterson, Joseph Masco, Laura McNamara, and the author of this review in collaboration with Christopher Henke. Gusterson's work is particularly relevant here because of its focus on Livermore scientists. While these authors cover key events and delve deeply into the mindset and experiences of weapons scientists, they do not provide a comprehensive institutional perspective or historical timeline for the weapons laboratories. The collection Doomed to Cooperate, compiled by Siegfried Hecker, Tarter's...

审核人：

• 美国实验室：劳伦斯·利弗莫尔国家实验室的内幕历史（作者：C。布鲁斯·塔特）
• 本杰明·西姆斯（生物）

在美国实验室，前劳伦斯·利弗莫尔国家实验室主任C.布鲁斯·塔特（Bruce Tarter）提供了该实验室从1950年代到2009年的详细历史。这是一个经过仔细研究的帐户，引用了许多主要来源和口述历史访谈。尽管本书的大部分内容专门介绍了可能引起内部人员兴趣的许多小型项目的行政细节和速览，但它还是提供了一个重要且研究不足的机构（Livermore）和时间（冷后期的信息）的有用记录。战争时期）。虽然塔特实验室的早期历史是全面的，这本书的出现真正体现了他对政治和技术策略的描述，该策略使武器实验室在冷战结束后继续在储备管理的专长下蓬勃发展。他对核武器向常规和官僚企业过渡的观察以及利弗莫尔实验室和洛斯阿拉莫斯实验室之间的文化差异，也阐明了这两个实验室在冷战时代到现在之间作用和影响的变化。

塔特（Tarter）将实验室之间的关系描述为一个古老，成熟，保守的机构（Los Alamos）与一家渴望创新并为自己取名的新兴公司（Livermore）之间的关系。洛斯阿拉莫斯（Los Alamos）是在国家紧急状态下经过紧急努力而出现的，与利佛摩（Livermore）的存在是艰苦奋斗的结果[End Page 1238]政治和技术斗争可以追溯到其主要创始人EO Lawrence和Edward Teller。按照塔特的说法，利弗莫尔在1960年代和1970年代一直是创新的驱动力，并迅速与洛斯阿拉莫斯（Los Alamos）成为平等合作伙伴，将其在核武器业务中的主张放到了一起，后者在满足现有限制的前提下大为满足。相对于洛斯阿拉莫斯，利弗莫尔仍然表现出更大的意愿进行政治和技术演习，以推动新的风险项目和概念，即使在技术可行性尚未完全确立的情况下。尽管这种策略使实验室得以发展，但在某些情况下却导致了技术和管理上的困难。积极推动军国主义，“强硬，反共的观点”，也为实验室的声誉做出了贡献。

塔特（Tarter）从1994年到2002年领导利弗莫尔（Livermore），这段时期涵盖了美国核武器综合体从冷战时期（专注于核武器的开发和测试）到多元化后的冷战后时期艰难过渡的核心。任务和加强官僚监督。美国实验室提供了这一时期的引人入胜的解释，部分是从塔特本人的角度来看的。它还强调了国防计划能源部长助理维克·里斯（Vic Reis）在发展“库存管理计划”中的作用，该计划使武器实验室能够在冷战后生存甚至繁荣。尽管塔特（Tarter）涵盖了许多其他参与者，但里斯（Reis）表现为充满活力和魅力的力量，打破了实验室在冷战后的不适感，鼓励了新想法，并为未来奠定了基础。如果他选择详细介绍这一时期而不是整个实验室历史，那么塔特可能写了一本更具针对性和易用性（如果不太全面）的书。

冷战后时期关于核武器实验室的许多学术工作都是由社会学家和人类学家完成的，其中包括唐纳德·麦肯齐和格雷厄姆·斯皮纳迪，休·古斯特森，约瑟夫·马斯科，劳拉·麦克纳马拉，以及本评论的作者与克里斯托弗合作。亨克 Gusterson的工作在这里特别有意义，因为它专注于Livermore科学家。尽管这些作者介绍了关键事件并深入研究了武器科学家的思维方式和经验，但他们没有为武器实验室提供全面的机构观点或历史时间表。收集注定要合作，由齐格弗里德海克尔编制，更酸的...