In a two-tier supply chain composed of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer, we consider the retailer’s sales cost to be private information and study the incentive effect of trade credit under information asymmetry. The model is formulated based on the principal–agent framework. We obtain the optimal trade credit contract configuration and further derive the optimal decision of the retailer, which are then compared with the results obtained from the benchmark case with symmetric information. We also analyze the influence of the retailer’s private information and risk-aversion behavior on the contract parameters and the retail price. The study shows that when the retailer’s risk aversion coefficient is within a certain range, the reasonable trade credit contract designed by the supplier can effectively encourage the retailer to report her real sales cost, and increase the supply chain profitability. Finally, numerical examples validate the theoretical model, and illustrate the impacts of private information and risk aversion on the profits of supply chain members and the system.

在由风险中立的供应商和规避风险的零售商组成的两级供应链中，我们将零售商的销售成本视为私人信息，并研究信息不对称下贸易信贷的激励效应。该模型是基于委托-代理框架制定的。我们获得最佳的贸易信贷合同配置，并进一步得出零售商的最佳决策，然后将其与从具有对称信息的基准案例中获得的结果进行比较。我们还分析了零售商的私人信息和规避风险行为对合同参数和零售价格的影响。研究表明，当零售商的风险规避系数在一定范围内时，供应商设计的合理的贸易信用合同可以有效地鼓励零售商报告其实际销售成本，并提高供应链的盈利能力。最后，数值算例验证了理论模型，并说明了私人信息和风险规避对供应链成员和系统利润的影响。