Recent advances in information and communication technologies have increased the incentives for firms to acquire information about rivals. These advances may have major implications for market entry because they make it easier for potential entrants to gather valuable information about, for example, an incumbent’s cost structure. However, little theoretical research has actually analyzed this question. This paper advances the literature by extending a one-sided asymmetric information version of Milgrom and Roberts’ (1982) limit pricing model. Here, the entrant is allowed access to an intelligence system (IS) of a certain precision that generates a noisy signal on the incumbent’s cost structure. The entrant thus decides whether to enter the market based on two signals: the price charged by the incumbent and the signal sent by the IS. Crucially, for intermediate values of IS precision, the set of pooling equilibria with ex-ante profitable market entry is non-empty. Moreover, the probability of ex-ante non-profitable entry is strictly positive. In classical limit pricing models, an entrant never enters in a pooling equilibrium, so this result suggests that the use of an IS may potentially increase competition.

中文翻译：

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具有两个相关信号的进入：工业间谍案及其积极的竞争效应

信息和通信技术的最新进展增加了企业获取竞争对手信息的动力。这些进步可能对市场进入产生重大影响，因为它们使潜在进入者更容易收集有价值的信息，例如现有企业的成本结构。然而，很少有理论研究真正分析过这个问题。本文通过扩展 Milgrom 和 Roberts (1982) 限制定价模型的单边不对称信息版本来推进文献。在这里，进入者可以访问具有一定精度的智能系统 (IS)，该系统会在现有企业的成本结构上产生噪声信号。因此，进入者根据两个信号决定是否进入市场：现任者收取的价格和 IS 发送的信号。至关重要的是，对于 IS 精度的中间值，具有事前有利可图的市场进入的集合均衡集是非空的。此外，事前非盈利进入的概率严格为正。在经典的限制定价模型中，进入者永远不会进入池化均衡，因此该结果表明使用 IS 可能会增加竞争。