Despite a growing literature on the politics of evaluation in international organizations (IOs) and beyond, little is known about whether political or administrative stakeholders indeed realize ex-ante political interests through evaluations. This is, however, especially important considering the booming business of evaluation and the proliferation of institutional assessments both in domestic and international politics. We argue that formally independent IO evaluation units informally orientate towards either member states or the IO administration, depending on who controls the unit’s budget, staff, and agenda resources. This should enable either actor to also use evaluation results along pre-defined strategic interests. Interview data gathered among evaluators, secretariat officials, and member state representatives of six IOs support the expected pattern, highlighting striking differences in the orientation of evaluation staff and evaluation use. Findings challenge the technocratic, apolitical image of evaluation, offering practical and theoretical implications for future research.

中文翻译：

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解释评价在国际组织中的政治用途

尽管关于国际组织 (IO) 及其他地方的评估政治的文献越来越多，但人们对政治或行政利益相关者是否确实通过评估实现了事前的政治利益知之甚少。然而，考虑到评估业务的蓬勃发展以及国内和国际政治中机构评估的激增，这一点尤为重要。我们认为，正式独立的 IO 评估单位非正式地面向成员国或 IO 管理部门，这取决于谁控制该单位的预算、人员和议程资源。这应该使任何一个参与者也可以根据预先定义的战略利益使用评估结果。在评估人员、秘书处官员、6 个 IO 的成员国代表支持预期的模式，突出了评估人员的定位和评估使用的显着差异。调查结果挑战了评估的技术官僚、非政治形象，为未来的研究提供了实践和理论意义。