Pain is an unwanted mental state that is often considered a sufficient ground for moral status. However, current science and philosophy of mind suggest that pains, like other perceptual states, might be nonconscious. This raises the questions of whether the notion of nonconscious pain is coherent and what its moral significance might be. In this paper I argue that the existence of nonconscious pain is conceptually coherent; however as a matter of fact our brains might always represent pains consciously. I then characterize the concept of suffering from a naturalistic perspective, distinguishing it from pain. I offer an account of suffering based on some current theories of consciousness, in which suffering consists in the global broadcasting of representations with overall net negative valence. I argue this can explain most of suffering’s properties, such as its wholeness, significance for welfare, and conscious character. Finally, I contend that suffering, but not pain, provides sufficient grounds for moral status.

疼痛是一种有害的精神状态，通常被认为是道德状态的充分依据。但是，当前的科学和心智哲学认为，痛苦与其他知觉状态一样，可能是无意识的。这就提出了以下问题：无意识疼痛的概念是否连贯，其道德意义可能是什么。在本文中，我认为无意识痛苦的存在在概念上是连贯的。但是事实上，我们的大脑可能总是有意识地代表疼痛。然后，我从自然主义的角度描述痛苦的概念，将其与痛苦区分开。我根据当前的一些意识理论对苦难进行了介绍，其中苦难包括对具有整体净负价的表示形式的全球传播。我认为这可以解释苦难的大部分特征，例如其整体性，对福利的重要性和意识品质。最后，我认为苦难而非痛苦为道德地位提供了充分的依据。