A number of thinkers have pointed to radical hope as both an appropriate affective state to motivate action in a time of radical change and perhaps the only appropriate reaction to the uncertainties expected in the Anthropocene. As Jonathan Lear characterizes it, radical hope is a hope that we might find a meaningful existence without the context and substantial constraints that previously provided one’s life with meaning. If we are to appeal to radical hope as an appropriate form of motivation in the Anthropocene, however, we need an appropriate object for that hope. We need some sense of what we are hoping for. In this paper I argue that the most appropriate objects for radical hope are ideals generated from the substantial freedoms required for any recognizably human good life. These substantial freedoms amount to Senian capabilities. While, owing to its inherent uncertainties, we cannot conceptualize with suitable specificity what a good life would be in the Anthropocene, we can recognize that it will be shaped by the substantial freedoms required for most any good life, that is, by capabilities. As capabilities express ideals about the good life, these ideals provide the appropriate object for radical hope. Hoping for ideals of the good life should provide an object for our motivation in a time when the specifics of that good life are unclear. Just as radical hope seems an appropriate response to our changing climate, the ideals underpinning capabilities provide a grounding for that hope suitable for the Anthropocene. Draft Copy: Do Not Site Without Author’s Permission 2 I. The Need for Hope “While there's life, there's hope.” (Cicero) The focus of this paper is hope, and how we should understand hope in the context of a world that we expect to be strikingly different from anything humans have experienced in the modern era. Perhaps the most striking characteristic of this new era, dubbed the anthropocene, is a lack of continuity with our environmentally stable past (IPCC 2012, 2014; Melillo et. al. 2014). This lack of continuity may put into question our ideas of the good life and what it is to flourish. In such conditions what should we hope for? The novelty and instability that pervades the anthropocene makes it difficulty to image the objects for which we might hope. Yet, normally, hope requires that we have at least a rough idea of that for which we hope. Characterizing sensible objects of hope will involve appealing to a highly unspecified conception of the good life, one we shouldn’t expect to know in any substantial detail in advance. That is a consequence of the instability that we can expect to become the new norm. In what follows I will suggest below that in conditions such as those we face we need a version of what Jonathan Lear and others have called “radical hope.” Here I will provide an account of radical hope that accommodates the need for an object to hope for, while recognizing the uncertainties and instabilities of the anthropocene. We can find the basis for these objects in ideals of the good life that underlie Senian capabilities. These substantial freedoms, which may be expressed quite differently across different social and environmental contexts, constitute ideals of the good life worth hoping for. This paper has a smaller point, and a larger point. The smaller point is that recent characterizations of a form of hope called radical hope are incomplete, and so prevent radical hope from being characterized in a way that allows us to focus on what we should be hoping for. The larger point comes from the realization that, in light of our changing environment, we need to think about the good life, surely the genus of much of what we hope for, in terms that are substantial enough to be expressed as an object of hope, yet flexible enough to accommodate a world in which much is novel. We should think of the good life, I will here presume (but have argued elsewhere, see Shockley 2014), in terms of capabilities. The larger point is that radical hope, appropriately understood, is the proper affective counterpart to a capabilities approach to Draft Copy: Do Not Site Without Author’s Permission 3 the good life. It provides content to our motivations, our reactions, in a time of great uncertainty and instability. We need something to counteract the fear and despair that seem to attend predictions of our future. In what follows, I will draw a connection between the hope that moves us in the face of the unknown and unfamiliar, and the ideals that ground and justify our actions. I will begin with a short discussion of the conditions that may make us look to hope, then I will consider various accounts of hope and provide a little criticism of those accounts. Following that I will shift to the primary focus of this paper, radical hope. I will proceed to provide an alternative conception of radical hope. The most appropriate objects for radical hope are ideals associated with substantial freedoms required for any recognizably human good life. These substantial freedoms amount to versions of Senian capabilities (Sen 2000, 2009; Schlossberg, 2012). These capabilities provide a form of stability in a time where instability will increasingly be the norm, and so provide an appropriately stable and enduring object for radical hope. I will not argue, but presume, that the flexible nature of capabilities provides a suitable framework for thinking about the good life or well being in a time of great instability (for an argument to this effect, see Shockley 2014). While we cannot conceptualize with suitable specificity what a good life would be in the anthropocene, we can recognize that it would be shaped by the substantial freedoms required for any possible good life, that is, by capabilities. Capability-based ideals then provide the appropriate object for radical hope. As capabilities provide the ideals of the good life in the anthropocene, radical hope provides the motivation necessary for the promotion of those ideals. In short, radical hope is well suited to capabilities. This has practical ramifications, although these ramifications are well beyond the scope of this short paper. How we think about the objects of hope informs how we think about conceptions of the good life more generally. Just as radical hope seems an appropriate response to our changing climate, the ideals I claim underpin those capabilities are the most appropriate foundation for social policy and political decisions in the anthropocene. As we think about designing policy and framing public deliberation in a time of climate change, we should expect this to become incredibly important. Draft Copy: Do Not Site Without Author’s Permission 4 II. Facing Instability Before we address hope, we should consider why it is so important to consider hope. 1 Sadly, our need for hope is nearly obvious. There are all too many reminders that our world is getting less hospitable. One particularly well-publicized reminder occurred on the first day of the COP19 conference in Warsaw when a member of the Philippine delegation gave an impassioned plea for action on climate change in response to the horrific damage done to the Philippines by Typhoon Haiyan. His plea will almost surely provide the dominant image of the opening of the Warsaw conference, and provided the narrative through which the public perceived that conference. Even if the precise relationship between particular meteorological events and climate change is complicated, natural disasters provide a vivid reminder of the loss and damage we can expect from a changing climate. Disasters of this sort are not new, of course. Yet a pervasive theme of the recent IPCC report is that the future will not be like the past. We should expect more and worse disasters. Extreme weather events: Climate-change-related risks from extreme events, such as heat waves, extreme precipitation, and coastal flooding, are already moderate (high confidence) and high with 1°C additional warming (medium confidence). Risks associated with some types of extreme events (e.g., extreme heat) increase further at higher temperatures (high confidence). (IPCC 2014, 12) The increased frequency and unpredictability of extreme events constitutes a form of environmental instability, one we can expect to be part of the new normal. This instability, our 1 But before I do that, I should make one important caveat. I have been taking for granted here the reality of the anthropocene, that the term “anthropocene” represents an era that is real and worthy of concern. But for my purposes here all I need is that the background environmental conditions we should expect to face in the future are substantially different in the past. I am using “anthropocene” to indicate that comparative novelty, and will leave it to the geologists to determine whether we are really in such a geological era (Crutzen 2002). Our climate is changing, and it is less predictable. And less stable. And that instability has ethically relevant consequences. Draft Copy: Do Not Site Without Author’s Permission 5 new normal, is an indicator of the anthropocene (Steffen, et al. 2007). From the Economist to the New York Times, “the anthropocene” has become a headline, and a meme for our time. 2 While the usual focus of discussions of the anthropocene is on the anthropogenic causes of the conditions in which we find ourselves, in what follows I would like to leave questions of causation and control aside, and focus instead on the ethical ramifications of the set of conditions evidencing the anthropocene. These conditions point us to increased variation in most environmental systems (IPCC 2012, 2014; Melillo et. al. 2014). In short, the dominant feature of the anthropocene is instability. The fundamental point of contrast is that whereas the anthropocene, our new world order, is characterized most centrally by instability, the holocene, the era in which modern societies have arisen and

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无论您身在何处，都过得很好：人类世的激进希望和美好生活

许多思想家指出，激进的希望既是在激进变革时期激发行动的适当情感状态，也是对人类世预期的不确定性的唯一适当反应。正如乔纳森·李尔 (Jonathan Lear) 所描述的那样，激进的希望是一种希望，我们可以找到有意义的存在，而没有以前为人们的生活提供意义的背景和实质性限制。然而，如果我们要将激进的希望作为人类世的一种适当的动机形式，我们需要为这种希望找到一个适当的对象。我们需要对我们所希望的有所了解。在本文中，我认为最适合激进希望的对象是从任何可识别的人类美好生活所需的实质自由中产生的理想。这些实质性的自由相当于塞尼亚的能力。尽管，由于其固有的不确定性，我们无法以适当的特异性概念化人类世中的美好生活，我们可以认识到，它将受到大多数美好生活所需的实质性自由的影响，即能力。由于能力表达了关于美好生活的理想，这些理想为激进的希望提供了适当的对象。在美好生活的细节尚不清楚的时候，对美好生活理想的希望应该为我们的动机提供一个对象。正如激进的希望似乎是对我们不断变化的气候的适当回应一样，支撑能力的理想为适合人类世的希望提供了基础。草稿：未经作者许可，请勿建站 2 I. 对希望的需要 “虽然有生命，但仍有希望。” (Cicero) 这篇论文的重点是希望，以及在一个我们期望与现代人类经历的任何事物截然不同的世界的背景下，我们应该如何理解希望。也许这个被称为人类世的新时代最显着的特征是与我们环境稳定的过去缺乏连续性（IPCC 2012, 2014; Melillo et. al. 2014）。这种缺乏连续性可能会质疑我们对美好生活和繁荣的想法。在这种情况下，我们应该希望什么？遍布人类世的新奇和不稳定性使得我们很难对我们可能希望得到的物体进行成像。然而，通常情况下，希望要求我们至少对我们所希望的有一个粗略的想法。描述希望的可感对象将涉及对美好生活的高度未指明的概念的诉求，我们不应该期望提前知道任何实质性细节。这是我们可以预期成为新常态的不稳定的结果。在接下来的内容中，我将在下面建议，在我们面临的这些情况下，我们需要一种乔纳森·李尔和其他人所说的“激进希望”的版本。在这里，我将提供一个极端希望的描述，它满足了对希望对象的需求，同时承认人类世的不确定性和不稳定性。我们可以在构成 Senian 能力基础的美好生活理想中找到这些对象的基础。这些实质性的自由在不同的社会和环境背景下可能以截然不同的方式表达，构成了值得期待的美好生活的理想。这篇论文有一个较小的点，一个较大的点。较小的一点是，最近对一种称为激进希望的希望的描述是不完整的，因此防止激进希望以一种使我们能够专注于我们应该希望的方式来表征。更重要的一点来自于认识到，鉴于我们不断变化的环境，我们需要考虑美好的生活，当然是我们所希望的大部分事物的种类，这些术语足以表达为希望的对象，但足够灵活以适应一个充满新奇的世界。我们应该考虑美好生活，我将在这里假设（但在其他地方有过争论，参见 Shockley 2014），就能力而言。更重要的一点是，正确理解的激进希望是草稿副本能力方法的适当情感对应物：未经作者许可请勿建站 3 美好生活。在充满不确定性和不稳定的时代，它为我们的动机和反应提供了内容。我们需要一些东西来抵消似乎伴随着对我们未来的预测的恐惧和绝望。在接下来的内容中，我将在面对未知和不熟悉的事物时推动我们前进的希望与为我们的行动奠定基础并证明其合理性的理想之间建立联系。我将首先简要讨论可能使我们期待希望的条件，然后我将考虑各种关于希望的描述，并对这些描述进行一些批评。接下来，我将转移到本文的主要焦点，激进的希望。我将继续提供另一种激进希望的概念。激进希望的最合适对象是与任何可识别的人类美好生活所需的实质性自由相关的理想。这些实质性的自由相当于 Senian 能力的版本（Sen 2000, 2009; Schlossberg, 2012）。在不稳定将越来越成为常态的时代，这些能力提供了一种稳定形式，因此为激进的希望提供了适当的稳定和持久的目标。我不会争辩，但假设，能力的灵活性质提供了一个合适的框架，用于在非常不稳定的时期思考美好生活或福祉（有关这种影响的论点，请参见 Shockley 2014）。虽然我们无法准确地概念化人类世中的美好生活，我们可以认识到，任何可能的美好生活所需的大量自由，即能力，都会塑造它。然后，基于能力的理想为激进的希望提供了适当的对象。由于能力提供了人类世美好生活的理想，激进的希望为促进这些理想提供了必要的动力。简而言之，激进的希望非常适合能力。这具有实际影响，尽管这些影响远远超出了这篇短文的范围。我们如何看待希望的对象会影响我们如何更普遍地思考美好生活的概念。正如激进的希望似乎是对我们不断变化的气候的适当回应一样，我声称支撑这些能力的理想是人类世社会政策和政治决策的最合适的基础。当我们考虑在气候变化时期设计政策和制定公共审议框架时，我们应该期待这变得非常重要。草稿副本：未经作者许可请勿建站 4 II．面对不稳定 在我们解决希望之前，我们应该考虑为什么考虑希望如此重要。1 可悲的是，我们对希望的需要几乎是显而易见的。有太多的提醒表明我们的世界越来越不那么好客了。一个特别广为人知的提醒发生在华沙 COP19 会议的第一天，当时菲律宾代表团的一名成员热情地呼吁对气候变化采取行动，以应对台风海燕对菲律宾造成的可怕破坏。他的请求几乎肯定会提供华沙会议开幕的主要形象，并提供公众对会议的看法。即使特定气象事件与气候变化之间的确切关系很复杂，但自然灾害生动地提醒我们，气候变化可能带来的损失和破坏。当然，这种灾难并不新鲜。然而，最近 IPCC 报告的一个普遍主题是未来不会像过去那样。我们应该期待更多和更严重的灾难。极端天气事件：极端事件（如热浪、极端降水和沿海洪水）带来的与气候变化相关的风险已经中等（高信度）和高 1°C 的额外变暖（中等信度）。与某些类型的极端事件（例如，极端高温）相关的风险在较高温度下进一步增加（高信度）。(IPCC 2014, 12) 极端事件的频率增加和不可预测性构成了环境不稳定的一种形式，我们可以期待成为新常态的一部分。这种不稳定性，我们的 1 但在我这样做之前，我应该做一个重要的警告。我在这里一直认为人类世的现实是理所当然的，“人类世”这个词代表了一个真实的、值得关注的时代。但就我在这里的目的而言，我所需要的只是我们未来应该面临的背景环境条件与过去有很大不同。我用“人类世”来表示比较新奇，并将留给地质学家来确定我们是否真的处于这样的地质时代（Crutzen 2002）。我们的气候正在发生变化，而且越来越难以预测。而且不太稳定。这种不稳定性会产生伦理相关的后果。草稿副本：未经作者许可请勿建站 5 新常态，是人类世的一个指标（Steffen 等人，2007 年）。从《经济学人》到《纽约时报》，“人类世”已成为我们这个时代的头条新闻和模因。2 虽然人类世讨论的通常焦点是我们所处环境的人为原因，但在下文中，我想将因果关系和控制问题搁置一旁，而将重点放在一系列的伦理后果上。证明人类世的条件。这些情况表明，大多数环境系统的变化都在增加（IPCC 2012、2014；Melillo 等人，2014）。简而言之，人类世的主要特征是不稳定。对比的基本点是，人类世，我们的世界新秩序，其最核心的特征是不稳定，而全新世，现代社会出现的时代和