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Signaling value of quality certification: Financing under asymmetric information
Journal of Multinational Financial Management ( IF 4.482 ) Pub Date : 2020-05-04 , DOI: 10.1016/j.mulfin.2020.100629
Barkat Ullah

This study investigates signaling value of internationally-recognized quality certification in improving firm’s access to external finance for 39,638 mostly small and medium-sized firms in 137 countries. We find that certified firms have better access to external finance as compared to otherwise equal uncertified firms. Certified firms use more bank finance and equity capital while uncertified firms rely more on informal sources of finance. Quality certification helps firms to credibly signal their unobserved quality to creditors and investors, reduce informational asymmetry, and have better access to external finance. We also find that the signaling value of quality certification is stronger in presence of greater information asymmetry. Smaller firms and firms in less developed economies and financial systems benefit more from certifications by gaining better access to external finance.



中文翻译:

质量认证的信号价值:信息不对称下的融资

这项研究调查了国际认可的质量认证对改善137个国家的39,638家大多数中小型公司的外部融资渠道的价值。我们发现,与其他情况相同的未经认证的公司相比,认证的公司更容易获得外部融资。认证公司使用更多的银行融资和股本资本,而未认证公司则更多地依赖非正式融资来源。质量认证可帮助公司向债权人和投资者可信地传达其未观察到的质量,减少信息不对称,并更好地利用外部融资。我们还发现,在存在更大的信息不对称性的情况下,质量认证的信令价值更强。

更新日期:2020-05-04
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