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Relationship Lending and Liquidation Under Imperfect Information
Journal of Financial Services Research ( IF 1.491 ) Pub Date : 2020-05-10 , DOI: 10.1007/s10693-020-00336-7
Eric Van Tassel 1
Affiliation  

Using a model of a competitive credit market, we study a firm’s choice between financing a production project using a transaction loan and a relationship loan. The project itself is characterized by uncertainty, with regards to both the amount and the timing of revenue. While the transaction lender enjoys a relatively lower cost of funds, the relationship lender’s advantage lies in being able to make a relatively more informed decision about the continuation value of the project in the event that the firm misses its initial payment obligation. In this setting, we make two important findings. First, we document how the firm’s optimal choice of loan type is dependent on both the liquidation value of the project and how accessible transaction credit is to distressed firms. Second, we investigate an opportunity for a lender to improve the quality of its lending relationship with the firm, and find that, under imperfect information, the lender may choose to decline certain welfare improving innovations.



中文翻译:

不完全信息下的关系借贷与清算

使用竞争性信贷市场模型,我们研究了公司在使用交易贷款和关系贷款为生产项目融资之间的选择。该项目本身的特点是在收入的数量和时间方面都存在不确定性。虽然交易贷方享有相对较低的资金成本,但关系贷方的优势在于能够在公司错过其初始付款义务的情况下就项目的持续价值做出相对更明智的决定。在这种情况下,我们有两个重要发现。首先,我们记录了公司对贷款类型的最优选择如何取决于项目的清算价值以及陷入困境的公司获得交易信贷的程度。第二,

更新日期:2020-05-10
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