Corporate insiders frequently borrow from lending institutions and pledge their personal equity as collateral for the loan. This borrowing, or pledging, potentially affects shareholder risk through changing managerial incentives or contingency risk. Using an exogenous shock to lending supply, we document a significant increase in risk arising from pledging. Difference-in-differences regressions indicate that insider pledging corresponds with a 16.5% relative increase in risk despite unchanged firm fundamentals. The empirical analysis supports contingency risk in linking pledging to volatility. Overall, our findings suggest that pledging allows influential insiders to extract private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders.

中文翻译：

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内幕股份质押和股权风险

企业内部人士经常向贷款机构借款，并将其个人股权作为贷款抵押品。这种借贷或质押可能会通过改变管理激励或应急风险来影响股东风险。利用对贷款供应的外生冲击，我们记录了质押风险的显着增加。差异中的差异回归表明，尽管公司基本面没有变化，但内部人质押与风险相对增加了 16.5%。实证分析支持将质押与波动性联系起来的或有风险。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，质押允许有影响力的内部人士以牺牲外部股东为代价来获取控制权的私人利益。