I analyze the impact of the formation of universal banks on corporate investment by looking at the gradual dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act’s separation between commercial and investment banking. Using a sample of US firms and their relationship banks, I show that firms curtail debt issuance and investment after positive shocks to the underwriting capacity of their main bank. This result is driven by unrated firms and is strongest immediately after a shock. These findings suggest that universal banks may pay more attention to large firms providing more underwriting opportunities while exacerbating financial constraints of opaque firms, in line with a shift to a banking model based on transactional lending.

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全能银行的实际影响：进入公共债务市场是否重要？

我通过观察逐步废除《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》对商业银行和投资银行业务的区分，来分析全能银行的形成对企业投资的影响。我使用美国公司及其关系银行的样本表明，在其主要银行的承销能力受到积极冲击后，公司会减少债务发行和投资。这一结果是由未评级的公司推动的，并且在受到冲击后立即表现得最强。这些发现表明，全能银行可能会更加关注提供更多承保机会的大公司，同时加剧不透明公司的财务约束，这与向基于交易贷款的银行模式的转变相一致。