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ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY AND BOARD MONITORING: EVIDENCE FROM CEO TURNOVERS
Journal of Financial Research ( IF 2.811 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-13 , DOI: 10.1111/jfir.12222
Melissa B. Frye 1 , Duong T. Pham 2
Affiliation  

We examine whether economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects a board's chief executive officer (CEO) replacement decision. We find that high EPU reduces the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. Our results support the idea that performance assessment may be more difficult when uncertainty is high. We provide evidence that succession planning may be important to firms in reducing the effects of EPU, as firms with an identifiable heir apparent are not influenced by high EPU. Likewise, voluntary CEO turnovers are not affected by EPU. Overall, our results provide evidence that boards make personnel decisions in response to external macroeconomic pressures.

中文翻译:

经济政策不确定性和董事会监测:CEO营业额的证据

我们研究经济政策不确定性(EPU)是否影响董事会首席执行官(CEO)的更换决定。我们发现较高的EPU降低了强迫CEO流动的可能性。我们的结果支持这样的想法,即不确定性很高时,绩效评估可能会更加困难。我们提供的证据表明,继任规划对于降低EPU的影响可能对企业很重要,因为具有明显可继承性的企业不受EPU较高的影响。同样,首席执行官自愿离职也不受EPU影响。总体而言,我们的结果提供了证据,表明董事会是根据外部宏观经济压力做出人事决定的。
更新日期:2020-08-13
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