The recent LIBOR and ISDAfix manipulation scandals have inspired discussions about survey-based financial benchmarks. I investigate surveys as the statistical inference problem plagued by the principal-agent frictions between benchmark administrators and banks. Without knowing the distribution of private signals, an administrator can implement a sufficient expected quadratic penalty through random audits and post-audit fines to minimize reporting errors and induce a distribution-free expected benchmark bias. Sufficiently frequent random audits that discipline the bank with maximum borrowing cost can mitigate the impact of constraints on post-audit fines. Finally, delaying the release of bank reports may not be effective in fighting collusion.

最近的 LIBOR 和 ISDAfix 操纵丑闻激发了关于基于调查的金融基准的讨论。我将调查作为受基准管理人员和银行之间委托代理摩擦困扰的统计推断问题进行调查。在不知道私有信号分布的情况下，管理员可以通过随机审计和审计后罚款来实施足够的预期二次惩罚，以最大限度地减少报告错误并诱导无分布的预期基准偏差。以最高借贷成本对银行进行纪律处分的足够频繁的随机审计可以减轻限制对审计后罚款的影响。最后，延迟发布银行报告可能无法有效打击勾结。