Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.

通过使用希腊危机期间向希腊公司提供的银行贷款数据，我们提供了证据，表明有关联公司可以进入其关联集团内部资本市场的情况，其贷款违约的可能性较小。此外，银行要求联属公司的贷款抵押品覆盖率较低，并且不太可能降低联属公司的信用状况。最后，银行更有可能表现出对不良贷款附属公司的宽容。结果与以下观点一致：银行共同管理与业务组中公司的关系，而不是将每个公司视为独立实体。我们的研究结果还表明，当外部融资稀缺时，通过内部资本市场分担风险的价值会增加。