In their recent article, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that enhanced counterforce capabilities are increasingly threatening the survivability of nuclear forces.1 They do not, however, provide a technically valid basis to support this judgment regarding the United States’ strategic submarine (SSBN) force. This omission raises doubts about the emergence of any new counterforce era against the U.S. arsenal. Lieber and Press base their claim partly on sources that reveal how U.S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) efforts against Soviet SSBNs during the Cold War beneated from advances in acoustic-gathering and data-processing capabilities (pp. 35–36). They then assume that further advancements within these domains should be expected to aid ASW efforts once again. Not only does this assumption predetermine Lieber and Press’s andings, but it ignores fundamental limits that physics places on technology and suggests that an updated review of U.S. SSBN vulnerability is long overdue in the public domain. Any such review should consider the key parameter that would drive the planning and execution of an ASW strategy to trail and destroy the entire SSBN force using passive acoustics over a considered period: the maximum range at which a U.S. SSBN may be detected. Neither Lieber and Press nor the most comprehensive source they cite attempts this review,2 but this is the starting point for any serious engagement with the covert trailing threat. Although precise information about the acoustic signal emitted by a U.S. SSBN that determines this parameter is not available in unclassiaed sources, a reasonable estimate of 90–110 decibels was made for the Ohio-class SSBN in the 1980s,3 with physical con-

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通信：新时代还是新错误？技术与威慑的未来

在他们最近的文章中，Keir Lieber 和 Daryl Press 认为，增强的反击能力正日益威胁着核力量的生存能力。 1 然而，他们并没有提供技术上有效的基础来支持关于美国战略潜艇 (SSBN) 的判断力量。这一遗漏令人怀疑是否会出现任何针对美国武器库的新反击力量时代。Lieber 和 Press 的主张部分基于一些消息来源，这些消息揭示了美国在冷战期间对苏联 SSBN 的反潜战 (ASW) 努力如何因声学收集和数据处理能力的进步而受益（第 35-36 页）。然后他们假设这些领域的进一步进步应该会再次帮助 ASW 工作。这个假设不仅预先决定了 Lieber 和 Press 的结局，但它忽略了物理学对技术的基本限制，并表明对美国 SSBN 漏洞的最新审查早就应该在公共领域进行了。任何此类审查都应考虑关键参数，该参数将推动反潜战战略的规划和执行，以在考虑的时期内使用被动声学追踪和摧毁整个 SSBN 部队：可以检测到美国 SSBN 的最大范围。Lieber 和 Press 以及他们引用的最全面的来源都没有尝试进行本次审查，2 但这是任何严肃处理隐蔽尾随威胁的起点。尽管在未分类的来源中无法获得有关确定该参数的美国 SSBN 发出的声学信号的精确信息，但在 1980 年代对俄亥俄级 SSBN 进行了 90-110 分贝的合理估计，