When rebel groups engage incumbent governments in war for control of the state, questions of international recognition arise. International recognition determines which combatants can draw on state assets, receive overt military aid, and borrow as sovereigns—all of which can have profound consequences for the military balance during civil war. How do third-party states and international organizations determine whom to treat as a state's official government during civil war? Data from the sixty-one center-seeking wars initiated from 1945 to 2014 indicate that military victory is not a prerequisite for recognition. Instead, states generally rely on a simple test: control of the capital city. Seizing the capital does not foreshadow military victory. Civil wars often continue for many years after rebels take control and receive recognition. While geopolitical and economic motives outweigh the capital control test in a small number of important cases, combatants appear to anticipate that holding the capital will be sufficient for recognition. This expectation generates perverse incentives. In effect, the international community rewards combatants for capturing or holding, by any means necessary, an area with high concentrations of critical infrastructure and civilians. In the majority of cases where rebels contest the capital, more than half of its infrastructure is damaged or the majority of civilians are displaced (or both), likely fueling long-term state weakness.

中文翻译：

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高风险和低门槛：国际认可如何影响内战的进行

当反叛团体为了控制国家而与现任政府交战时，就会出现国际承认的问题。国际承认决定了哪些战斗人员可以利用国家资产、获得公开的军事援助以及作为主权借款——所有这些都会对内战期间的军事平衡产生深远的影响。第三方国家和国际组织如何决定内战期间谁是国家的官方政府？从 1945 年到 2014 年发起的 61 场寻求中心战争的数据表明，军事胜利并不是获得承认的先决条件。相反，各州通常依靠一个简单的测试：控制首都。夺都并不预示军事胜利。在叛军控制并获得承认后，内战通常会持续多年。虽然地缘政治和经济动机在少数重要案件中胜过资本控制测试，但战斗人员似乎预计持有资本就足以获得承认。这种期望会产生不正当的激励。实际上，国际社会奖励以任何必要手段占领或控制关键基础设施和平民高度集中的地区的战斗人员。在叛乱分子争夺首都的大多数情况下，其一半以上的基础设施遭到破坏或大多数平民流离失所（或两者兼有），这可能会加剧国家长期疲软。这种期望会产生不正当的激励。实际上，国际社会奖励以任何必要手段占领或控制关键基础设施和平民高度集中的地区的战斗人员。在叛乱分子争夺首都的大多数情况下，其一半以上的基础设施遭到破坏或大多数平民流离失所（或两者兼有），这可能会加剧国家长期疲软。这种期望会产生不正当的激励。实际上，国际社会奖励以任何必要手段占领或控制关键基础设施和平民高度集中的地区的战斗人员。在叛乱分子争夺首都的大多数情况下，其一半以上的基础设施遭到破坏或大多数平民流离失所（或两者兼有），这可能会加剧国家长期疲软。