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Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–16
International Security ( IF 7.179 ) Pub Date : 2017-01-01 , DOI: 10.1162/isec_a_00259
Daniel Sobelman 1
Affiliation  

What are the sources of deterrence stability and under what conditions can weak actors deter stronger adversaries? To deter a superior adversary, the weak actor must convince it that if conflict breaks out, the weak actor would be capable of rendering its opponent's strategic capabilities tactical and its own tactical capabilities strategic. The deterrence relationship that has evolved between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah in the decade since—and as a result of—the 2006 Lebanon War (a.k.a. the Second Lebanon War or the July War) confirms this observation. A comparison of these two actors’ deterrence behavior in the years preceding the war and in its aftermath shows that one of the leading explanations for the ongoing stability along the Israeli-Lebanese border is that Israel and Hezbollah have learned to apply deterrence in a manner that meets the prerequisites of rational deterrence theory.

中文翻译:

学会威慑:在以色列与真主党冲突中威慑失败和成功,2006-16

威慑稳定性的来源是什么?弱者在什么条件下可以威慑更强大的对手?为了威慑优势对手,弱者必须说服它,如果冲突爆发,弱者将能够使对手的战略能力成为战术性的,而自身的战术能力也具有战略性。自 2006 年黎巴嫩战争(又名第二次黎巴嫩战争或七月战争)以来的十年中,以色列与黎巴嫩真主党之间演变的威慑关系证实了这一观察结果。
更新日期:2017-01-01
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