For years, the U.S. government has been waging counterterrorism campaigns against al-Qaida and other armed groups in safe havens and weak states. What explains the effectiveness of such campaigns? The variation in effectiveness may result from differences in select tactical, organizational, and technological capabilities of the counterterrorism state and its local partner, captured by the concept of the Legibility and Speed-of-Exploitation System (L&S). Empirical studies, including novel fieldwork data, on the U.S. drone war in Pakistan's Waziristan region from 2004 to 2014 reveal the influence of the L&S on targeted groups. From 2004 to 2007, a lack of U.S. counterterrorism capabilities aligning with the L&S allowed both al-Qaida and the Pakistan Taliban to build their operational infrastructure, expand their bases, engage in extensive recruitment drives, and broker important local alliances. In contrast, as the United States made substantial improvements in the L&S from 2008 to 2014, the campaigns against both groups became increasingly effective. Both al-Qaida and the Pakistan Taliban experienced sustained reductions in operational capabilities, losses of bases, and high desertion rates; they also faced growing political challenges, including from within their own organizations. These findings contrast with the view that counterterrorism offers short-term gains at best and is counterproductive at worst.

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什么解释了反恐效力？来自美国在巴基斯坦无人机战争的证据

多年来，美国政府一直在安全避风港和弱国发动针对基地组织和其他武装团体的反恐运动。什么解释了此类活动的有效性？有效性的差异可能是由反恐国家及其当地合作伙伴在选择战术、组织和技术能力方面的差异造成的，这一点被易读性和利用速度系统 (L&S) 的概念所捕获。2004 年至 2014 年美国在巴基斯坦瓦济里斯坦地区的无人机战争的实证研究，包括新的实地调查数据，揭示了 L&S 对目标群体的影响。从 2004 年到 2007 年，美国缺乏与 L&S 保持一致的反恐能力，这使得基地组织和巴基斯坦塔利班得以建立他们的行动基础设施，扩大他们的基地，参与广泛的招聘活动，并促成重要的当地联盟。相比之下，随着美国从 2008 年到 2014 年对 L&S 进行了实质性改进，针对这两个群体的运动变得越来越有效。基地组织和巴基斯坦塔利班都经历了作战能力持续下降、基地损失和高逃兵率；他们还面临着越来越多的政治挑战，包括来自他们自己组织内部的挑战。这些发现与以下观点形成对比，即反恐充其量只能提供短期收益，而在最坏的情况下会适得其反。基地组织和巴基斯坦塔利班都经历了作战能力持续下降、基地损失和高逃跑率；他们还面临着越来越多的政治挑战，包括来自他们自己组织内部的挑战。这些发现与以下观点形成对比，即反恐充其量只能提供短期收益，而在最坏的情况下会适得其反。基地组织和巴基斯坦塔利班都经历了作战能力持续下降、基地损失和高逃跑率；他们还面临着越来越多的政治挑战，包括来自他们自己组织内部的挑战。这些发现与以下观点形成对比，即反恐充其量只能提供短期收益，而在最坏的情况下会适得其反。