Between the 1991 Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi regime faced a cheater's dilemma: how much should it reveal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities when each additional revelation made it less likely that the country would be rewarded, while continued denial also prevented the lifting of sanctions. The Iraqi leadership struggled to resolve this dilemma, as elites pursued competing policies and subordinates did not consistently obey Saddam Hussein's orders. These difficulties reflected principal-agent problems that were aggravated by the leadership's initial attempts to deny and cover up Iraq's WMD capabilities. Together, the cheater's dilemma and principal-agent problems explain a range of puzzling Iraqi behaviors that came across as calculated ambiguity to the outside world. These findings offer insights into the incentives and constraints that shape how other authoritarian regimes respond to external pressures to eliminate their WMD, and the extent to which they are willing and able to disclose information about past programs and their past efforts to conceal this information from the outside world.

中文翻译：

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骗子的困境：伊拉克、大规模杀伤性武器和战争之路

在 1991 年海湾战争和 2003 年美国领导的入侵之间，伊拉克政权面临着一个作弊者的困境：当每一次额外的揭露都使得该国不太可能被揭露时，它应该在多大程度上揭露伊拉克的大规模杀伤性武器（WMD）能力？得到奖励，而继续否认也阻止了制裁的解除。伊拉克领导层努力解决这一困境，因为精英们奉行相互竞争的政策，而下属并没有始终遵守萨达姆侯赛因的命令。这些困难反映了委托代理问题，由于领导层最初试图否认和掩盖伊拉克的大规模杀伤性武器能力而加剧了委托代理问题。作弊者的困境和委托代理问题共同解释了伊拉克人的一系列令人费解的行为，这些行为在外界看来是经过计算的模棱两可。