While it has repeatedly been observed that pastoralist resource governance systems tend not to conform to the assumptions and principles of mainstream scholarship on property rights and governance of commons, coherent theoretical reasons why this is the case are less common. One exception is the concept of open property regimes . This view holds that the quintessential features of dryland pastoralist systems—limited and highly variable rainfall, low resource density, mobility, and institutions and norms that emphasize flexibility and access—can result in pastoralist herders dynamically distributing and redistributing themselves across a territory without the assumed benefit of clear boundaries or of collective decision-making and rules. However, the open property regimes explanation describes some pastoralist systems better than others. This paper argues that some pastoralist systems are neither conventional commons nor open property regimes. Instead they tend reflect another model, referred to here as a complex mosaic regime , in which there is gradation of strength and clarity of exclusionary property rights over different resources, in which property rights are often unbundled and allocated to different actors and governance mechanisms, and in which a prominent role is played by social processes and governance mechanisms other than property rights institutions. Social and biophysical characteristics that may be more conducive to complex mosaic regimes than to open property systems, particularly if all of those characteristics are found together, include a severe and chronic shortage of one or more critical resources, spatial heterogeneity of resources, scalar heterogeneity of interests, and a herd mobility pattern that involves occasional convergence on highly valued key resource areas. In elaborating the complex mosaic regime model, this paper addresses a blind spot in scholarship on property rights and commons, deepening the understanding of why pastoralist systems tend not to conform to mainstream theory, as well as helping to explain some of the differences among pastoralist systems. Understanding the internal logic of alternative resource governance regime models and the social-ecological conditions that make one model more viable than another can help to guide national policies and the strategies of conservation and development actors.

中文翻译：

---

开放的财产和复杂的镶嵌图：牧民社会生态系统中权属制度的变化

尽管反复观察到，牧民的资源治理制度往往不符合主流学者关于财产权和公共治理的假设和原则，但这种情况的连贯理论原因却很少见。开放财产制度的概念是一个例外。这种观点认为，旱地牧民系统的典型特征-降雨有限且变化很大，资源密度低，流动性低，强调灵活性和获取性的制度和规范-可能导致牧民在没有假设的情况下在整个领土上动态地分布和重新分布明确界限或集体决策和规则的好处。但是，开放财产制度的解释比其他制度更好地描述了一些牧民制度。本文认为，某些牧民制度既不是传统的公地，也不是开放财产制度。相反，它们倾向于反映另一种模型，在这里称为复杂的镶嵌体制，在这种模型中，排他性财产权对不同资源的等级和清晰度有所不同，其中财产权通常被捆绑在一起并分配给不同的参与者和治理机制，并且其中，产权机构以外的社会程序和治理机制发挥着重要作用。社会和生物物理特征可能比开放式产权制度更有利于复杂的镶嵌体制，尤其是如果所有这些特征都被发现在一起，则包括长期和长期缺乏一种或多种关键资源，资源的空间异质性，利益的标量异质性，以及羊群流动性模式，涉及偶尔在高度重视的关键资源领域上的融合。在阐述复杂的镶嵌体制模型时，本文探讨了财产权和公地学领域的一个盲点，加深了对为什么牧民制度倾向于不符合主流理论的理解，并有助于解释牧民制度之间的某些差异。 。了解替代性资源治理制度模型的内部逻辑以及使一种模型比另一种模型更可行的社会生态条件，可以帮助指导国家政策以及保护和发展参与者的战略。在阐述复杂的镶嵌体制模型时，本文探讨了财产权和公地学领域的一个盲点，加深了对为什么牧民制度倾向于不符合主流理论的理解，并有助于解释牧民制度之间的某些差异。 。了解替代性资源治理制度模型的内部逻辑以及使一种模型比另一种模型更可行的社会生态条件，可以帮助指导国家政策以及保护和发展参与者的战略。在阐述复杂的镶嵌体制模型时，本文探讨了财产权和公地学领域的一个盲点，加深了对为什么牧民制度倾向于不符合主流理论的理解，并有助于解释牧民制度之间的某些差异。 。了解替代性资源治理制度模型的内部逻辑以及使一种模型比另一种模型更可行的社会生态条件，可以帮助指导国家政策以及保护和发展参与者的战略。