Advances in IT suggest that computerized intelligent agents (IAs) may soon occupy many roles that presently employ human agents. A significant concern is the ethical conduct of those who use IAs, including their possible utilization by managers to engage in earnings management. Following economics and moral disengagement theory, we investigate how financial reporting decisions are affected when they are supported by the work of an IA versus a human agent, with varying autonomy. In a 2 x 2 between-participants experiment with experienced managers, we manipulate agent type and autonomy, finding that managers engage in less aggressive financial reporting decisions with IAs than with human agents, and engage in less aggressive reporting decisions with less autonomous agents than with more autonomous agents. Path analysis suggests that managers’ perception of control over their agent and ability to diffuse responsibility for their financial reporting decisions serially mediate the effect of agent type and autonomy on managers’ financial reporting decisions. Our results have implications for regulators and practitioners, where the adoption of computerized intelligent agents can attenuate managers’ earnings management activity by preventing them from diffusing responsibility for their actions to others.

中文翻译：

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智能代理和代理自治对经理人分散盈余和参与盈余管理能力的衰减作用

IT的进步表明，计算机化智能代理（IAs）可能很快会扮演目前雇用人工代理的许多角色。一个重要的问题是使用IA的人员的道德行为，包括管理人员可能利用IA从事收益管理。遵循经济学和道德脱离接触理论，我们研究了在具有不同自治权的IA与人工代理的支持下，财务报告决策将如何受到影响。在与经验丰富的经理进行的2 x 2参与者间实验中，我们操纵代理人的类型和自治，发现与IA代理相比，与IA代理相比，经理与IA代理相比不那么积极进取的财务报告决策，与IA相比，与更少的自治代理相比，经理不那么积极进取的报告决策更多自治代理。路径分析表明，管理人员对代理人控制权的感知以及分散其财务报告决策责任的能力会依次调节代理人类型和自主权对管理人员财务报告决策的影响。我们的结果对监管者和从业者具有启示意义，在这些领域中，采用计算机智能代理可以防止经理将对自己的行为的责任分散到他人身上，从而削弱经理们的盈余管理活动。