Proponents of decentralization often argue that decentralization makes governments more accountable and responsive to the governed. This is perhaps why the decentralization literature tends to overlook Middle Eastern regimes as these are among the most authoritarian and most centralized regimes in the world. However, many of these regimes have included decentralization in their legal framework. This article shows how a weak regime can use decentralization as a regime maintenance strategy when formal decentralization reforms strengthens external and internal legitimacy. The articles main argument builds on the literature on decentralization and elite capture to show how weak regimes can use formal decentralization reform to undermine local autonomy. The article uses the case of Yemen to make this argument. Yemen has a long tradition for local bottom‐up initiatives and there is widespread internal support for decentralization. Simultaneously, donors have seen decentralization as a way of strengthening the Yemeni state, leading to international support to the formulation of the Local Authority Law of 2000, Law 4/2000, an extensive legal decentralization framework.

中文翻译：

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分权是维持政权的战略：也门的情况

权力下放的支持者常常认为，权力下放使政府对问责制更加负责和响应。这也许就是为什么权力下放文学往往忽视中东政权的原因，因为它们是世界上最专制和最集中的政权之一。但是，其中许多制度在其法律框架中都包括了权力下放。本文显示了当正式的分权改革加强内部和外部合法性时，弱小的政权如何利用分权作为维持政权的策略。文章的主要论点建立在关于权力下放和精英俘获的文献上，以显示弱势政权如何利用正式的权力下放改革破坏地方自治。本文以也门的情况为例。也门在地方自下而上的倡议方面有着悠久的传统，内部也广泛支持权力下放。同时，捐助者将权力下放视为加强也门国家的一种方式，从而得到了国际社会对制定2000年《地方当局法》，第4/2000号法律（广泛的法律权力下放框架）的支持。