Two opposing theories explain the European Central Bank's (ECB) far‐reaching powers: principal‐agent and trusteeship. This article situates both theories on a sliding scale of delegation, with agents on one end of the spectrum, and trustees on the other. Applying this new perspective to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) allows us to understand how the ECB, positioned on the agent side of the scale by the ESM Treaty, slides towards the trustee side in practice. This way, the article identifies two problems. Firstly, the ECB assumes a ‘zone of discretion’ that is not captured by the control mechanisms, thereby disregarding an essential feature of delegation. Secondly, the rationale of the Meroni doctrine, judicial review, is disregarded given the insufficient protection against the ECB's actions. These findings become increasingly important with the long‐term aim to incorporate the ESM in the EU legal order

中文翻译：

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欧洲央行在 ESM 条约下的表现，授权规模不断扩大

两种对立的理论解释了欧洲中央银行 (ECB) 的深远权力：委托代理和托管。本文将这两种理论都置于一个可滑动的授权范围内，一方面是代理人，另一方面是受托人。将这种新视角应用于欧洲稳定机制 (ESM)，让我们能够了解欧洲央行如何在实践中滑向受托人一方，而欧洲央行根据 ESM 条约位于规模的代理方。这样，文章就发现了两个问题。首先，欧洲央行假设了一个不受控制机制控制的“自由裁量区”，从而忽视了授权的一个基本特征。其次，鉴于对欧洲央行行动的保护不足，Meroni 学说的基本原理，即司法审查，被忽视了。