We study a conflict of two individuals over a valuable resource. We construct a sequential game where the first individual, the Owner, decides whether to defend the resource and the other individual, the Intruder, decides whether to attack and try to steal the resource. Individuals know the value of the resource to themselves. This provides the individuals an estimate of the value of the resource to the opponent. We build a mathematical model that allows us to quantify and vary the accuracy of this estimate. We study how the outcomes of the game depend on the accuracy. We show that, in our setting, the accuracy does not matter to the Intruder but it does to the Owner. For resources of a large value, the Owner benefits from a smaller accuracy. However, for resources of a small value, the Owner benefits from a bigger accuracy.

中文翻译：

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具有相关资源价值的所有者-入侵者竞争

我们研究了两个人对宝贵资源的冲突。我们构建了一个顺序博弈，第一个个体，所有者，决定是否保护资源，另一个个体，入侵者，决定是否攻击并试图窃取资源。个人知道资源对自己的价值。这为个人提供了对对手资源价值的估计。我们建立了一个数学模型，使我们能够量化和改变这个估计的准确性。我们研究游戏的结果如何取决于准确性。我们表明，在我们的设置中，准确性对入侵者无关紧要，但对所有者却很重要。对于价值较大的资源，所有者受益于较小的准确性。但是，对于价值较小的资源，所有者受益于更大的准确性。