Prisoner’s dilemma game is the most commonly used model of spatial evolutionary game which is considered as a paradigm to portray competition among selfish individuals. In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn, a strategy updating rule base on aspiration, has been proved to be an effective model to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game, which leads aspiration to receive lots of attention. In this paper, according to Expected Value Theory and Achievement Motivation Theory, we propose a dynamic aspiration model based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in which individual’s aspiration is inspired by its payoff. It is found that dynamic aspiration has a significant impact on the evolution process, and different initial aspirations lead to different results, which are called Stable Coexistence under Low Aspiration, Dependent Coexistence under Moderate aspiration and Defection Explosion under High Aspiration respectively. Furthermore, a deep analysis is performed on the local structures which cause defectors’ re-expansion, the concept of END- and EXP-periods are used to justify the mechanism of network reciprocity in view of time-evolution, typical feature nodes for defectors’ re-expansion called Infectors, Infected nodes and High-risk cooperators respectively are found. Compared to fixed aspiration model, dynamic aspiration introduces a more satisfactory explanation on population evolution laws and can promote deeper comprehension for the principle of prisoner’s dilemma.

囚徒困境博弈是空间进化博弈中最常用的模型，被认为是描绘自私个体之间竞争的范例。近年来，基于抱负的策略更新规则Win-Stay-Lose-Learn已被证明是促进空间囚徒困境游戏中合作的有效模型，这导致抱负得到了很多关注。在本文中，根据期望值理论和成就动机理论，我们提出了一种基于Win-Stay-Lose-Learn规则的动态抱负模型，其中个人的抱负受到其回报的启发。发现动态抱负对进化过程有重要影响，不同的初始抱负导致不同的结果，这被称为低抱负下的稳定共存。，中等抽吸下的依赖共存和高抽吸下的缺陷爆炸。此外，对导致叛逃者重新扩张的局部结构进行了深入的分析，考虑到时间演化（叛逃者的典型特征节点），使用END-和EXP时期的概念来证明网络互惠机制的合理性。找到分别称为“感染者”，“感染节点”和“高风险合作者”的重新扩展。相对于固定愿望模型，动态愿望对人口演变规律提供了更令人满意的解释，并且可以促进对囚徒困境原理的更深刻理解。