This paper focuses on the mechanism of interaction among the strategic choices of a shore power system including government, port enterprises, and liner companies. Based on an evolutionary game model, the influence of shore power implementation on the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) of the multiple stakeholders is discussed. The observations show that whatever stage they are in and whatever their initial strategies are, the government always chooses to use incentives, port enterprises prefer to implement shore power, and liner companies choose to modify shore power facilities. Furthermore, the initial strategy of government has a significant influence on the strategic evolution of port enterprises and liner companies. Beyond that, the higher the policy cost and the bigger the social benefits of implementing shore power without government incentives, the sooner the government will move to the “non-incentive” strategy.

本文着重研究岸电系统（包括政府，港口企业和班轮公司）的战略选择之间的相互作用机制。基于演化博弈模型，讨论了岸电实施对多个利益相关者的演化稳定策略（ESS）的影响。观察结果表明，无论处于什么阶段，无论其初始策略是什么，政府总是选择使用激励措施，港口企业倾向于实施岸电，班轮公司则选择修改岸电设施。此外，政府的初始战略对港口企业和班轮公司的战略发展具有重大影响。除此之外，