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Competition between manufacturers and sharing economy platforms: An owner base and sharing utility perspective
International Journal of Production Economics ( IF 12.0 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-05 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2020.108022
Fei Ye , Debing Ni , Kevin W. Li

We develop a two-period, five-stage game model with sharing utility to analyze how a manufacturer competes with a sharing economy platform that facilitates sharing of the manufacturer's product from both a long-run and a short-run perspective. We use the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to reveal how the manufacturer chooses its long-run (period-1) price to foster an owner base (a collection of the period-1 product buyers) that in turn affects its short-run (period-2) competition with the sharing economy platform (hereafter, platform for short). Analytical results show that (1) in the short run, an increase in the owner base has a negative (non-monotonic) impact on the profitability of the manufacturer (platform) while an increase in sharing utility negatively (positively) affects the profitability of the manufacturer (platform); (2) in the long run, the existence of the platform could be irrelevant for, pose a threat to, or benefit the manufacturer contingent upon different levels of sharing utility; (3) in the long run, a win-win scenario is attainable for both the manufacturer and platform when sharing utility is high enough. The managerial implication of this research is that the manufacturer and platform should collaborate to improve sharing utility to a sufficiently high level by enhancing the sense of community belonging, fostering benefits from sharing activities, and addressing sustainability concerns, thereby achieving a win-win result.



中文翻译:

制造商与共享经济平台之间的竞争:所有者基础和共享公用事业的观点

我们开发了一个具有共享实用程序的两阶段,五阶段博弈模型,从长期和短期的角度分析了制造商如何与共享经济平台竞争,该平台促进了制造商产品的共享。我们使用子博弈的完美Nash均衡来揭示制造商如何选择其长期(第1期)价格来建立所有者基础(第1期产品购买者的集合),进而影响其短期(第1期产品购买者) 2)与共享经济平台(以下简称平台)竞争。分析结果表明:(1)在短期内,所有者基础的增加对制造商(平台)的盈利能力具有负面(非单调)的影响,而共享效用的增加则对制造商(平台)的利润具有负面(积极的)影响。制造商(平台);(2)从长远来看,平台的存在可能与制造商(取决于不同程度的共享效用)无关,威胁或使制造商受益;(3)从长远来看,当共享效用足够高时,制造商和平台都可以实现双赢。这项研究的管理意义在于,制造商和平台应该合作,通过增强社区归属感,从共享活动中受益并解决可持续性问题,从而将共享效用提高到足够高的水平,从而实现双赢。当共享实用程序足够高时,制造商和平台都可以实现双赢。这项研究的管理意义在于,制造商和平台应该合作,通过增强社区归属感,从共享活动中受益并解决可持续性问题,从而将共享效用提高到足够高的水平,从而实现双赢。当共享实用程序足够高时,制造商和平台都可以实现双赢。这项研究的管理意义在于,制造商和平台应该合作,通过增强社区归属感,从共享活动中受益并解决可持续性问题,从而将共享效用提高到足够高的水平,从而实现双赢。

更新日期:2021-02-17
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